HEIDEGGER

 

IL DASEIN be unveiled for the Dasein that is doing the asserting, that is, must be intra worldly.  

But since, as was said of Lotze, any assertion refers to a more primary unveiling of the entity, to being true, the copula is not itself determinable or concretizable in any assertion because it refers to what is always already unveiled before any assertion.

The  'is' bears witness to that third element of the intentional structure at work in any  assertion that allows the 'asserting about-asserted about' structure to be. 

In any assertion   about the entity, essentia and existentia, whatness and the mode of being of the entity is   already pre-understood, since the entity is intra worldly.

 Aristotle says that truth is not in   things, but in the understanding. But this simply says that the truth is not extant like   things, and so it is unclear what it means to say that the truth is in the understanding. But   since understanding is a mode of the comportment of Dasein, it must be inquired into in   relation to Dasein. Only if the nature of the understanding is cleared up can it be claimed   in what sense Aristotle says that truth is in the understanding. Heidegger suggests that   "truth neither is present among things nor does it occur in a subject [as a psychic process]   but lies - taken almost literally - in the middle 'between' things and Dasein. Being true   in the sense ofaletheia or unveiling is something that Dasein does to beings so that they   can stand forth in there being, and, as was is true in the case of the shoemaker, allows     71   Dasein to understand itself. The shoemaker understands the produced shoes in such a   way that the shoemaker unveils himself as a shoemaker at the same time. Hence, it   belongs to Dasein' s existence, is a mode of Dasein' s being, a way that Dasein is (BP,   216)." Truth occurs in the subject, but not in the problematic sense of the assertion that   then has to agree with something outside the mind, but rather as a way of Dasein's being.   As the threefold intentional structxire belongs to truth, Heidegger comments that   To the Dasein as unveiling there belongs essentially something unveiled in its  unveiledness, some entity to which the unveiling relates in conformity with its  intentional structure. There belongs to unveiling, as to every other intentional  comportment, an understanding of the being of that to which this comportment  relates as such. In unveiling assertion the Dasein is directed toward something  which it understands beforehand in that entity's unveiledness ... Truth and being-  true as unveiledness and unveiling have the Dasein 's mode of being (BP, 217)   Hence, in the unveiledness of the unveiled thing, Dasein as unveiling is relating to   something that has Dasein's mode of being. In other words, Dasein already has an   understanding of the being that is unveiled because the unveiledness of that unveiled   being has the mode of being of the Dasein. This does not mean that the entity, such as   the unicorn, implies a relation to Dasein, but rather that the mode of being of the unicorn,   'imaginary,' does. Hence, truth as unveiling is a determination of Dasein, and   unveiledness is a possible determination of the extant, insofar as Dasein, for lack of a   better phrase, gives 'something' that has Dasein's mode of being to the extant when it   comports itself to the extant (such as happens when Dasein makes an assertion about it).   Generally speaking, in whatever way Dasein comports itself to an entity,   something in the entity will have the mode of the being of Dasein because that third   element in the intentional structure, as is easily shown in the case of illusions, is a     72  structural element of the intentional act itself, regardless of whether we are speaking of  the unveiledness of the unveiled, or the objectness (standing-over-againstness,  gegenstand) of the object, or anything else. Standing-over-againstness is not a necessary  determination of the object, but rather a possible one that is necessary insofar as Dasein  is comporting itself towards it, and is, in Heidegger's terms, what is mean by the phrase  Dasein 's Transcendence. Unveiledness, Truth, therefore, is not in the subject or the  object, but somehow between them. What this third something is in its being still needs  to be determined, since all that is known so far is that Dasein must already understand  the entity in some sense if it comports itself to the entity, that is, insofar as the entity is in  the world.   The question, though, is becoming more difficult, because it is still unclarified in  what sense Aristotle's theory of the judgement is to be understood in relation to the being  of man. It should at least be noted that, according to the manifold senses of 'Being'  illustrated (essentia and existentia), that being cannot be a genus, and must be analogical,  since both existence and essence pertain to beings, and existence and essence both are,  but not in the same way. In order to clarify the matter somewhat, we must show how  Aristotle casts light on the relation of the assertion to the being of Dasein by considering  being as presence and the at-hand.  (V) Dasein and Presence-at-Hand   Of the many senses of essence that Heidegger attempts to explicate in terms of  the Greek theory of production, the first is morphe or shape, which we discussed earlier.  The form, which, as producing, is primarily to be understood in terms of a forming-so-as-     73  to-give-shape, was one of the primary senses of essence for the Greeks. The forming, for  the Greeks, allows there to be a particular entity to be looked at, and hence for the Greeks  the thinghood of the thing consists of these two elements (form and look). Heidegger  comments that   Forming and shaping lend its own peculiar look to what is to be produced and has  been produced. Look is the ontological sense of the Greek expression eidos or  idea. In the look of the thing we are able to see what it is, its thingness, the  peculiar character impressed on it (BP, 106).   Conceptually, for the Greeks, the look that something presents is grounded in the thing's   form or morphe.   Heidegger claims, however, that for the Greeks the ontological significance of the   look-form relation is not determined by the form, in the sense we would say that the form   is understood to determine the look we have of the thing in perception. Rather, look,   understood ontologically, determines the form or morphe for the Greeks, because the   look is primarily to be taken as a production, not as a perception. Forming, as Heidegger   says, is enacted on something in the light of an anticipation of a model, guide or   standard of some sort. The painter, for instance, utilizes the paint and creates a painting   according to a model, an idealized painting that is the actual painting before hand, its   ground. This model, which is anticipated before hand, carries the ownmost sense of   eidos, ^^ which is why the shaped or formed product is understood as a posterior likeness   of the look or eidos, and is grounded in it. In this sense essence as form carries the sense     '^It is therefore imprecise to characterize the primary sense of eidos as the look of the thing at  hand, as Mehta does, "Idea or eidos means the look, the view presented by anything that confronts us, its  visage (Philosophy, 416)." Eidos primarily has the sense of the look of the thing prior to its coming into  being.     74   of production:   If the shaped product, the form (morphe), is founded in the eidos, then this means  that both concepts are understood by reference to the process of shaping, forming,  producing. The order and connection of these two concepts is established by the  performance of the process of forming and shaping and the necessary precedence  in that process of the look of what is to be formed. (BP, 107).   Prior to actualization, then, the entity qua thing actually formed already was before (ti en   einai), as anticipatory look in the imagination. It is from the eidos that the formed thing   receives its genos, which is not simply a group in the sense oi genus but rather its kind,   its family or stock. The determination 'group' does not carry the specificity of sense that   'family {gene ton ontonf does, because one might say 'this entity belongs to this group   accidentally.' 'Family,' on the other hand, does, in the sense that we would say that (C)   Smith is on account of having been produced by (A), and (B), or in relation to what was   said earlier, that the particular work of art is essentially of that stock, and that 'Art' is not   some indifferent category that lords over it.   The notion of eidos as seeing-before is also brought out in what the Greeks   understood as the mathematical. In Greek, the mathema are those things which are   properly leamable, of which numbers are the exemplary case. These things are properly   leamable because we already have them with us somehow. We say, for instance, that   there are three books. We do not read 'threeness' off the books, but already have a vague   idea of it, which enables us to identify the books as just these particular three. Given this   particular instance of the mathematical, the mathematical in general is this dimension of   the thing that is always already with us in an indeterminate way.   The mathematical is that evident aspect of things within which we are always  already moving and according to which we experience them as things at all, and     75   as such things. The mathematical is this fundamental position we take toward  things by which we take up things as already given to us, and as they should be  given. Therefore, the mathematical is the fundamental presupposition of the  knowledge of things. Therefore, Plato put over the entrance to his Academy the  words 'Let no one who has not grasped the mathematical enter here!' These  words do not mean that one must be educated in only one subject - 'geometry,'  but that he must grasp the fundamental condition for the proper possibility of  knowing is the knowledge of the flmdamental presupposition of all knowledge  and the position we take based on such knowledge (WT, 75-6).   It was said earlier that one of the primary determinations of essence in the   Greeks, phus is, denoted production in the sense of a self-producing, a production out of   itself, as in the growing of a plant. The actual plant becomes actualized out of its own   nature (phusis), wliich in this case serves the function of the eidos or look in the previous   example. The actual maple tree, so to speak, is an incomplete expression of its nature,   maple tree-ness. The produced being, which comes to be and passes away, is produced   out of its own nature or phusis, the being of that particular entity, which is prior than it   and not itself subject to change. Plato also infers from this that the most true, the being   of the entity which gives rise to it, is also the most actual, to vAt phusis carries existentia   as well as essentia. The actualization of the possible presses the entity into a fully   finished limit or boundary, so that the entity is now available to be trapped in a   definition, "the concept that comprehends the boundaries containing the reality of what   has been formed (BP, 108)." Hence, for the Greeks, whatever makes up a producing   which results in the actual produced thing constitutes is essence or thinghood of the   entity, and is understood as the productive comportment of Dasein towards entities, and   specifically in terms of the productive seeing explained earlier. This is clear enough in   terms of artifacts, and also with things we do not produce if we consider the notion of a     76  productive-seeing-before-hand.   (VI)TheDaofDaseiii   The Da of Dasein is the place of entities, insofar as an entity is understood as   something actualized, fully fuiished and produced and hence available for use (available   to be contemplated, worked with, etc.). Once the entity is produced it is available and is   understood as being in such a way that it is already fully standing on its own account and   available for whatever use we may have for it (such as is the case with the shovel   currently resting out in the shed), our property. According to Heidegger, as understood in   the aforesaid context, the entirerty of these useful entities is, for the Greeks,   hupokeimenon:   to/7ro-duce, to place-Aere, //er-stellen, means at the same time to bring into the  narrower or wider circuit of the accessible, here, to this place, to the Da, so that  the produced being stands for itself on its own account and remains able to be  found there and to lie-before there [vorliegen] as something established stably for  itself. This is the source of the Greek term hupokeimenon, that which lies-before.  That which first of all and constantly lies-before in the closest circle of human  activity and accordingly is constantly disposable is the whole of all things of use,  with which we constantly have to do, the whole of all those existent things which  are meant to be used on one another, the implement that is employed anA the  constantly used products of nature: house and yard, forest and field, sun, light and  heat. What is thus tangibly present-for-dealing'with'^ [vor-handen] is reckoned  by everyday experience as that which is, as a being, in the primary sense.  Disposable possessions and goods, property, are beings; they are quite simply that  which is, the Greek ousia. In Aristotle's time, when it already had a firm  terminological meaning philosophically and theoretically, this expression ousia  was still synonymous with property, possessions, means, wealth (BP, 108).   To say that, for the Greeks, an entity's existentia, existence, or mode of being is   presence-at-hand, means that an entity, in accordance v^ath its being a finished or     "The dashes connecting the present string of words does not exist in the English version of this  text, but the sense suggests that they be linked in some way.     77  produced thing, is present or available for our disposal, but more specifically it is there in  our immediate vicinity or field of concerns. This is the case whether or not the being is  an artifact, whether it is produced by human hands or not, for reasons we have seen. An  entity is extant or actual to the extent that it is actually produced and hence available for  us. This is why Heidegger says that, for the Greeks, "a being is synonymous with an at-  hand [extant] disposable (BP, 108-109)." Hence, for the Greeks, ousia or essence did  not carry a sense that essence does today, whereby essence is strictly separated from  existence - nor can it be, as Aristotle's critique of Antiphon showed. Ousia for the  Greeks is a whatness/thingness and extantness/mode of being, although for the Greeks  the existence (presence) aspect is stressed much more than the essence aspect (which is  the opposite of how things are for us today).   For the Greeks, the presence of the entity does not refer to a quality of the entity  as disposable, but our finding or encountering the entity as disposable, not after the fact,  but in its production. The entity is produced, whatever the specific purpose it will serve,  in such a way that it is a production towards the producing of a finished, available,  present-at-hand entity. The presence at hand is intended in the production, what  Heidegger calls "an out-look upon the look (eidos) of that which is to be produced.  When Parmenides says that being, thinking and actuality are the same, he has in mind  something like the forethought that anticipates a producing (cf BP, 1 10)," although the  precise sense of this will need to be dealt with more explicitly later. This thought is, for  Parmenides, not creative in the sense of something that the individual person comes up  with, but rather something that comes to the thinker, somewhat like what we would call     78  'inspiration.' This is because the Greeks fundamentally understood 'seeing' as an insight  given to them, in the sense that the Oracle is given a sign of the things to come (though  not a detailed account) by the divinity. In a sense it could be said that anyone who has  the capacity for such things, or has stayed up all night in the attempt to figure something  out which all of the sudden 'comes to them' at four in the morning, realizes that thinking,  in its essence, is a waiting and a being given. This is correct, but imprecise.   Insight [Einsehen] is not different from what is meant above, but it is not quite  that arbitrary either. The notion of insight essentially bears the mark of impotence on the  part of the cognizing individual. Generally speaking, it is a seeing, not in the sense of  seeing a thing, but rather in the sense of what must already be seen in order to see a  particular thing (In the ZoUikon seminar Heidegger sites the specific case of having to  already 'see' the 'existence' of a table even though [following Kant] exisence is not a  quality of the table), (cf Z, 7) What primarily interests Heidegger, though, is not the fact  that we always already operate in lieu of these various ontological determinations which  are generally hidden to us, but rather what is needed in order to force them out of their  hiding place. Being is held in a hiding-waiting, this is the theos or god or ground out of  which it emerges, (cf N, 184) This is specifically accomplished via various kinds of  steresis of privation, which Plato first successfully isolated in the sophist. We will be  examining the notion of privation throughout this thesis.   Heidegger sets himself the task of understanding the connection and original  unity of essentia/existentia in the productive comportments of Dasein, which ancient  ontology operates according to even thought this is never an explicit theme for them.     79  The point, then, is to '"conceive beings with respect to their being by having regard to the  Dasein (psuche, nous, logos) (BP, 1 10)." When there is the productive comportment of  the Dasein, such as is explicit in the production of great artwork, it operates in such a  way the thing is produced so as to make it stand on its own, not suggesting itself of a  relation to the producer (cf PLT, OWA, 40, 65; BP, 1 13). We say, for instance, that the  greatness of a particular painting or sculpture of piece of poetry lies in the fact that it is  not simply the reflection of the peculiarities of the creator, but rather is produced in such  a way that it stands forth in its own greatness, regardless of who made it. The in-itself of  the product is not simply present in the finished product, but is intended in the producing,  to wit producing does not simply refer to the act of the Dasein, but the in-itself of the  product. The peculiarity, then, is that something produced in no way, as might be  suggested by common understanding, refer back to the producer. Insofar as the self-  eflFacement of the producer is intended in the production, the produced entity is what it is  precisely because it does not refer back to the producer (cf BP, 1 14). Being and Time,  for instance, is what it is for us, not because Heidegger wrote it, but because it has its  qualities in itself, irrespective of who wrote it. Had, for instance, Scheler constructed the  piece, it would lose nothing. Production happens in such a way that the in-itselfiiess of  the product is intended along with whatever it happens to be in its peculiarity.   It may be contended that this analysis is interesting and yet tnte because it is  simply an analysis of produced entities, and clearly every entity caimot be said to resuh  from the productive comportment of the Dasein. Did not the Greeks take for their theme  the cosmos as a whole which was eternal, and not anything produced or the productive     80  comportments of the Dasein? This characterization, \^ch would appear to be the case,   is manifestly false. Heidegger argues that, as in the production of a house, there is  material used that is not itself produced but rather already available for the production.  Hence, productive comportment does not restrict itself to that which needs to be  produced, but also relates itself, for instance, to the material used in production. But  then what is not itself in need of production does not become manifest as an in-itself  primarily, as the produced entity did, but rather is discovered primarily in the production  process. In Heidegger's words, "The understanding of being in production is so far from  merely understanding beings as produced that it rather opens up precisely the  understanding of the being of that which is already simply extant (CF. BP, 1 16)." Unless  this was the case, we would be not be able to understand matter as that which is already  there so as to be available for production. Production, then, as Heidegger says, "served  as the horizon for the ontological interpretation of beings (BP, 1 16)" for the Greeks.  That this was the case for the Greeks was one thing, but it must be recalled why this was  the case, namely, that in a productive seeing hyle was that which was primed to emerge  as eidos.   It can be seen, then, that the assertion and judgement imply a relation to the  comportment of Dasein to things. But now that this has been established, we need to ask  what the various kinds of comportments were that the Greeks felt Dasein could have to  things. The reason is that, as was said at the beginning of this chapter, the Greeks  understood the philosophical way of life as the highest kind of existence. In the next  chapter we will see that this is specifically related to the kinds of beings that     81  philosophical Dasein is related to.     82  CHAPTER4   The Greek Positing of the Philosopher in Relation to the Tragic Nature of Greek   Existence   The aim of this chapter is to inquire into the various ways that Aristotle outlined  that Dasein comports itself toward entities. What is hoped here is that the philosopher  will be shown to be the highest mode of existence for the Greeks precisely because of the  way in which the philosopher 'is' and the kinds of entities the philosopher comports  itself to. It was said earlier that the Dasein is attuned by a fundamental boredom, a  refiisal of things, to wit nothing can concern or oppress us absolutely. What we will now  begin to see is that the Greeks not only understood this, but they also emphasized that  there is an essential restlessness to himian existence, whereby himian are driven,  according to their essential unhomeliness, to be satisfied with the beings they are  concerned with, and yet never are. We shall approach this here according to aletheia,  unhiddeness, specifically the uncovering of beings.  (I) The Mode of Aletheia in Aristotle   Heidegger suggests that the Greek concept of truth, which for modem thinking  means the agreement of the judgement with its object, that is, correctness as certainty, '''  was understood as unhiddetmess, in the same form that we would say imperfect or blind  (not-seeing). The notion of the unhidden is important because it implies a relation to the  hidden, a wresting fi-om the hidden. Heidegger indicates that this occurs in a twofold     '"Although certainty as the ultimate arbiter of truth only entered the western tradition following the  Christian theological interpretation of truth, specifically in Luther and Thomas, and there only under the  specific rubric that arose for a need for the certainty of the salvation of the soul (cf esp.P 51-4).     83   way for the Greeks. In the first place, it means that the uncoveredness of the Being of   beings is not simply given, but need to be wrested from hiddenness. This is meant in the   same sense that we say how the Being of a being is not simply given, but must be   uncovered or made manifest through our cognitive efforts. For the most part. Being as   such is uncovered in the everyday only insofar as everyday Dasein requires it. This   allows understanding (comfortably familiar) commerce with the entities that are closest   to us and which we are primarily concerned with - however it also means that Being is   primarily veiled. Secondly, whatever of Being is originally uncovered according to the   needs of everyday Dasein is, more or less immediately afterward, covered up again by   idle talk when what is understood as Being becomes locked down in concepts and   truisms. Heidegger comments that   Dasein need not bring itself face to face with entities themselves in an 'original'  experience; but it nevertheless remains in a Being-towards these entities. In a  large measure uncoveredness gets appropriated not by one's own uncovering, but  rather by hearsay of something that has been said (BT, 266)   We should note that it is such things as truisms that Plato constantly attacked in the   dialogues, taking common opinions and "breaking through truisms and coming to a   genuine understanding of the phenomenon (PS, 9)." Consequently, for Plato "[wjith   regard to this double coveredness, a philosophy faces the tasks, on the one hand, of   breaking through for the first time to the matters themselves (the positive task) and, on   the other hand, of taking up at the same time the battle against idle talk (PS, 11)."   For Heidegger, Aletheia as imconcealedness of the Being of beings requires that   the beings be encountered, and therefore the disclosure of the being of beings requires     84  that there be a Dasein, since Disclosing is a mode of the being of Dasein, that is,  disclosure or removing the world from coveredness is a way in which the Dasein is.  Aletheia generally manifest itself in legein or speaking, insofar as it is a speaking about  the world. This speaking about the world is a way in which E^asein expresses itself, in  the sense that it announces itself as the sort of being that speaks about the world, is  concerned about the world and the things in it, and this self-expressive speaking about is  "what most basically constitutes human Dasein (BP, 12)." For Aristotle this logos  primarily took the form of either an affirmation or denial of some quality of a thing,  although this required a prior disclosiveness of the entity. For, as Heidegger says, even if  we were to deny a certain quality of something it must already have been disclosed what  the thing is so that we know the particular quality is what does not belong to it.   For Heidegger's reading of the Greeks, Aletheia, the disclosing of beings  according to affirmation and denial, is outlined by Aristotle in five differem way in the  Nicomachean Ethics (VI, 3, 1 149b 15ff). The five ways are "know-how (in taking care,  manipulating, producing), science, , circumspection (insight), understanding, and  perceptual discernment. As an appendix, Aristotle adds 'to deem,' 'to take something as  something [in the sense of 'I deem it worthy, I take it as being worthy],' and 'doxa, view'  [in the sense of 'in my view'], opinion. These latter two determinations have the  possibility of being false, "can distort beings, [they] can thrust [themselves] ahead [of  beings] (PS, 15)," though they need not be. If, in my opinion, I view something thusly, it  may or may not actually be the case. Hence, along with general concealment and idle  talk, there is a third way that beings are concealed, through error connected to deeming     85   and opinion.   Let us briefly consider what Heidegger interprets Aristotle to be describing in the  various modes of Aletheia. Know-how in taking care, manipulating and producing is  manifested in specific modes, such as the mode of tailor or that of shoemaker. Know-  how does not refer to the actual producing that is enacted by the tailor or shoemaker, but  the know-how that the tailor or shoemaker already has so that they are able to produce.  Science is a kind of theoretical knowledge of things. Circumspection (insight) is like  know-how, except that the object of its inquiry is the human, not artifacts. Wisdom is  real understanding, that which the philosopher engages in. 'Mind' or nous is somewhat  different, in that it is " a discernment that discerns by way of perception. Noein had  emerged already at the decisive beginning of Greek philosophy, where the Destiny of  Greek and Western philosophy was decided, namely in Parmenides: discerning and what  is discerned are the same (PS, 16)." Discernment with perception is the only one of the  modes of aletheia that is not a speaking, although it is connected to legein.   Heidegger suggests that Human Dasein is in truth insofar as it is with unconcealed  beings by striving against the threefold concealedness of beings elucidated above, while  the 'they' or 'the many' are generally not striving toward the unconcealing of beings.  This does not mean that being in truth has to do with a possession of objective truths,  since prejudices and 'the obvious' are often seen as objective and universally valid even  though they distort the matters that they are supposed to be revealing. On the other hand,  something can be genuinely true, if only for one person.   Heidegger points out that the Logos is the speaking (legein) and the spoken     86  (legomenon). If the speaking is preserved in the spoken and is hence a proper  proposition, then the spoken is alethes. This is how truth is generally understood,  although it is also where problems can arise. If truth is located in the spoken or said,  then we can adhere to the said without actually tracing it back to the matter at hand.  Heidegger gives the example of the proposition or said 'Some days ago it rained.' He  writes that "[s]ome days ago it rained, I can say, without presentifying to myself the rain,  etc. I can repeat propositions and understand them without having an original relation to  the beings of which I am speaking (PS, 18)." This means, I can understand the  proposition as true without calling to my mind the image of the raining itself that I  experienced on that day, or even without actually having experienced the raining, but  merely having heard about it second hand. This is for the Greeks, Heidegger says,  something that is a so-called \x\xXh without a genuine aletheuein going on, because there  is no real connection between the proposition and the matter it discusses, an idle talking.  It is, Heidegger says, the logos of idle talk, the detached proposition which has lost the  connection to the matters themselves in the sense illustrated above that is true or untrue  in the sense that we now understand these terms, correct and false. Since the said is  detached from the matters at hand, truth becomes the agreement of the proposition with  them. But, Heidegger says, to determine truth as the correspondence of the proposition  and the thing necessitates that there has already been a prior revelation of the being itself,  the truth as uncovering. Hence   such a concept of truth, which determines truth as the correspondence of the soul,  the subject, with the object, is nonsense. For I must have already known the  matter in question in order to be able to say that it corresponds with the     87   judgement. I must have already known the objective in order to measure the  subjective up to it. The truth of 'having already known' is thus presupposed for  the truth of knowing. And since this is nonsensical, this theory of truth cannot be  maintained (PS, 18).   I must have already presentified to myself in some way, for instance, the connection of  the experience of raining and the proposition 'it was raining' in order for the two to later  become detached and then have the ability for them to be reconnected, depending on  \^iiether I thought that in this circumstance it was actually the case or not. The general  adhering of Dasein to the said instead of trying to get to the real matter is part of what  Heidegger calls Dasein's 'fallenness'.   Heidegger provides a useful categorization to help us understand what has been  said. In terms of four of the ways in which aletheia was outlined above - science,  wisdom, know-how and circumspection (insight) - science and wisdom are epistemonikon,  contributive toward the development of knowledge, and know-how and circumspection  (insight) are logistikon, contributive toward the development of circumspective  consideration or deliberating. 'What' dimension is disclosed about a being depends on  'how,' the 'way in which' it is approached, either through epistemonikon or logistikon.  The fifth determination oi aletheia, nous, is not strictly present under epistemonikon or  logistikon because nous or 'mind' is somehow present in each of science, wisdom, know-  how and circumspection (insight), since they are dianoein, ways in which noein can be  enacted (cf PS, 20). Heidegger characterizes the distinction between epistemonikon and  logistikon in the following way   The epistemonikon is that ... with which we regard beings whose archai cannot be  otherwise, ... beings which have the character ofaidion, of being eternal. The  logistikon is that ... with which we regard beings ... that can also be otherwise.     f.-i.,     88   The [logislikon] are the beings techne and phrones is deal with. Techne has to do  with things which first have to be made and which are not yet what they will be  [since, as Heidegger said, techne has to do with the know-how that proceeds the  actual producing]. Phronesis [circumspection, insight] makes the situation  accessible; and the circumstances are always different in every action. On the  other hand, episteme and sophia concern that which already was, that which man  does not first produce (PS, 20).   This is not a^wr/b/c/ distinction that is the result of any grandiose speculation, but rather   a compartmentalizing of the various ways in which everyday Dasein deal with beings.   There are, so to speak, two regions of Being which are investigated according to which   the way Dasein comports itself, although in a sense there is only one. Kisiel says "the   mode of... comportment or disclosive capacity differs accordingly as the kind of being   which is revealed differs (Genesis, 303)." The entities of the logistikon, the constantly   changing things of home and country, which have the characteristics of the possibility of   being otherwise, is what it is in contrast to the beings of the epistemonikon, such as the   heavens and the stars, the world of nature, which are always the same. Insofar as the   philosopher pursues that which is always the same, 1 shall show why the philospher is the   highest mode of Greek Dasein.   (II) The Relative Strength of the Modes of Uncovering   Heidegger points out that Aristotle raises the question as to the whether the   epistemonikon or the logistikon is better in uncovering beings as they are. To begin to   answer this, Aristotle says that the greatest mode of uncovering beings in terms of the   epistemonikon, so that we are "dwelling with them (PS, 21)," is wisdom, genuine   understanding, while the greatest mode for the logistikon is circumspection (insight).   There is always a stratification regarding the degree to wdiich an entity has been     89  uncovered, and the ways in which the world is uncovered for Dasein are not all  indifferently on the same plane. For Heidegger, what is interesting is that Aristotle in his  most in depth analyses does not proceed from the highest modes of aletheuein, but rather  the lowest, science and know-how, those modes which are most accessible to everyday  Dasein. I will now delineate the precise meanings of science, wisdom, know-how and  circumspection (insight) in Heidegger's reading of Aristotle.   The question which is asked of all of the modes of aletheuein is twofold in  Aristotle: "1). What is the character of the beings which the mode of aletheuein  uncovers, and 2)does the respective mode of aletheuein also disclose the arche of those  beings? (PS, 22)," although it is initially unclear why this is. Heidegger suggests that the  first determination of the entities toward which science orients itself is that they are  determined within the horizon of time. The beings of the science or knowing are  understood on the basis of time, as those which always are, cannot be otherwise. Science  has the sense of being informed about something, already knowing it. I understand this to  mean that if, for instance, someone was beginning to teach me what the boiling px)int of  water was a standard room pressure by showing me the water being heated to 100  degrees Celsius, I would stop them and say that I already know that, am already informed  on that point. This is possible because the object of my knowledge always is that way,  the boiling point never alters, and hence I can be informed about it. Things, on the other  hand, which I cannot be informed about have a transitory character and hence require me  to be present with them at every moment (as otherwise I would not have a grasp on them)  are not objects of knowledge in this sense. Hence, to have an opinion about that which     90   changes could be wrong if the thing itself is not present, and hence such a cognitive  relation to the changing is not knowledge. In this way, in science I tarry beside the being  even if it is not actually present to me.   Heidegger suggests that the beings that science apprehends neither came into  being nor will they go out of it, but rather are constantly. As such, the being that science  orients itself toward is most properly a being. But, since the being of the entities that  science orients itself to are determined as (their how, epistemic entities as epistemic  entities, as opposed to, for instance, gear as gear) being constantly, then "beings are  determined with regard to their Being by a moment of time ... The onto are aidia [aei,  aiwn], ..always, everlasting, ... that which coheres in itself, that which is never  interrupted (PS, 23)." DeBoer says "Aristotle's question concerning beings as beings -  that is to say, concerning that which essentially belongs to beings - is guided by a specific  concept of being as such: that which of beings is constantly present for a theoretical  beholding is above all that which is (DeBoer, 27)." Let us consider why DeBoer is not  entirely correct here.   Aristotle, in De Caelo, also understands the aion as a lifetime, ton apanta aiona,  fiill presence, the determinate time of a living thing is presence. But how can it be that a  living thing, since it only has a finite existence, is aiwn, and the objects oi science, the  beings that are a being in its most proper sense, are also aiwnl For Aristotle, the aiwn  also means the time of the world, which is eternal. The living thing's aiwn, its  determinate life which receives its determination by being limited by birth and death, is  determined in relation to the heavens (cf PS, 23), ouranos, in the sense that the     91   changeable is understood as changeable in contrast with the eternal, the stars and the  heavens. Let us consider this further.   Heidegger suggests that the Aidia always are, and hence are earlier than the things  that come into being and pass away. They are always 'now,' and this presence is what  for the Greeks, in a certain sense, meant Being. Since the changeable and the perishable  are determined in relation to presence, the aidia are what most properly is, and are the  arche or origin of all other beings. Without this everlasting ground, the determinations of  beings would be entirely unintelligible. The heavens for Aristotle are not in time but are  nonetheless eternal, because for Aristotle what is in time is what is measured by time, by  means of the nows, and what is constantly and always now is thereby numberless and not  limitable (apeiron), is not measurable by the nows, and is none-the-less eternal, earlier  than anything that comes into time. The aidion is thus not in time but none-the-less  determined in this way. Heidegger suggests that, for Aristotle, then, the being of beings  is interpreted in the horizon of time, "beings are interpreted as to their Being on the basis  of time (PS, 24)," whether or not for Aristotle this projection ever became a specific  theme or not. To say that the objects of science, which are most properly being, are  interpreted on the basis of time, means that beings as being are understood within a  temporal horizotL   Heidegger suggests that the second determination of the objects of science is that  they are something demonstrated, teachable and leamable. Science or knowledge is of  such a kind that it can be taught, and know-how also bears this quality. Teachability or  communicability is the most essential determination of science, which is why     n   mathematics is the premier science, since it is the most teachable. Moreover, since we  are in some sense always with the objects of science and hence do not have to actually  uncover them. Public oratory is a speaking that is also teachable because it is based on  the use and manipulation of what everyone already commonly understands. Heidegger  makes the interesting point, however, that oratory is not a demonstration, but does create  belief in something by invoking such an obvious example that it is taken by the audience  to be universal (katholou), applicable beyond that specific case because of the  obviousness of it, which may or may not be an accurate revelation of the matter at hand.  In other words, oratory is a leading as opposed to a demonstration.   Heidegger points out that the sullogismos also works in this way, by proceeding  from what is accepted by everyone and hence not a questionable matter itself to what  seems to follow from it, or in other words the conclusion is reached from what is known  at the outset. This is how science works. It is able to teach what is not known because it  is simply a precession firom what is already knovm. Mathematics is hence eminently  teachable because the student simply proceeds from the mathematical axioms without  having to actually understand or question the axioms themselves. The axioms, for  instance, of math, occasionally have a proof of them, but this is done mathematically,  through deduction or the establishment of relations, and hence already presuppose that  which the proof is being attempted of Hence, says Heidegger, science and sullogismos  cannot, as the striking example of the orator seems to do, unveil the arche as the universal  {katholou), which is why oratory is not science and science needs something that it  cannot explain out of itself There is only a science because something has already     93  provided a foundation for it.   Heidegger argues that, for Aristotle, if science cannot disclose the arche, the  beings as such, then it is deficient, since it requires something else. Therefore, science is  not the highest mode of aletheue in with respect to the epistemonikon, but rather wisdom  has this honor. Within science itself, there is also a deficient mode, which only knows the  result without a sullogismos, without an understanding of how the result was arrived at.  Generally, though, science does not show that which show themselves,'* the everlasting  beings as everlasting, and therefore the arche remains hidden. This is the answer to the  twofold question that was suggested earlier as the structures of the modes of aletheuein,  in this case, of the science. It reveals its beings in such a way that has been described,  and is therefore a deficient kind of aletheuein, in that it cannot, firom out of itself, truly  exhibit the Being of the beings that it deals with.   Just as the science within the epistemonikon, know-how within the logistikon is  also the most immediate form, that which is dealt with by people in the everyday, and  also has the two-fold questioning pertaining to it, and is also deficient. The most  immediate in either case is aletheuein, but ungenuine aletheuein. Science disclosed the  beings that are everlasting, while know-how discloses beings that can be different. Since  the objects of know-how are not the produced things as such but the object contemplated  in the producing, they have possibility, can be brought into Being differently, and are  constantly becoming, therefore.   Heidegger points out that all of the modes of aletheuein have some manner of     '^phainomena ' in Greek, cf HCT, 81.     94   science within them. The objects of know-how are the purely possible and hence could   come into being otherwise than it is currently being conceived of. In other words, the   beings of know-how are in the process of becoming, since they are purely possible. What   is to be produced is not yet, and hence is not always and could come into being otherwise   than according to the vision we have of it. Know-how is a preparing to execute or enact   or bring something into being correctly. Know-how does not have the idea of the thing as   its goal, but rather the thing itself, and hence the idea is not in the thing itself, but beside   it, in the sense it is in the soul. In contrast, the beings of nature do not have human   creators, so that which guides the production and the thing produced (eg. Plant from   seed) are identical. Know-how is not a genuine aletheuein because the finished product   does not belong to the domain of know-how, as once the product is done, it ceases to be a   concern of know-how, and falls into the domain of human use.   The shoe is made for wearing and is for someone. This double character entails  that the ergon of Wv^poiesis is something produced for further use, for man.  Techne therefore possesses the ergon as an object of its aletheuein only as long as  the ergon is not yet finished. As soon as the product is finished, it escapes the  domain of techne: it becomes the object of the use proper to it. Aristotle  expresses this precisely: the ergon is "para' (cf Nic. Eth. 1, 1, 1094a4f ). The  ergon, as soon as it is finished, is para, 'beside,' techne. Techne, therefore, is  concerned with beings only insofar as they are in the process of becoming (PS,  29)."   Therefore, Heidegger says that in know-how, the outward look of the thing is that which   is in the soul before hand and which guides the production, the outward look being the   "proper presence" of the thing to be produced, what is 'pre-presentified'   [vergegenwartigt]. I understand this to mean, for instance, that the house which will   some day be present is presentified beforehand as it is going to look. Heidegger points     95  out that the matter is what does not have to be produced but is that from which the thing  is produced and is in a certain sense already there in the outward look. The producer  always has his eye on the outward look as he enacts the production, the movement, the  outward look being the arche of the movement. Hence, as is proper to an arche, it is  there at the inception and at all points along the way.   Circumspection (insight), unlike know-how, has as its concern human action.  There is deliberation about circumspection (insight), and hence the object here is the  best way to act. Heidegger says that the "deliberation of circumspection (insight) is,  furthermore, a certain drawing of conclusion: if such and such is supposed to occur, if I  am to behave in such a way, then ... [T]he deliberation of phronesis, like that of know-  how, is related to something which can be otherwise (PS, 35)." In a certain regard know-  how and circumspection (insight) are similar because both have to do with outcomes and  what must happen in order for those outcomes to come to fruition. However, in the case  of know-how the actions themselves are not the object of consideration, but rather the  things to be produced. On the other hand, in circumspection (insight), there is  deliberation on the actions of one to whom the actions belong, "Dasein is the arche of  the deliberation of phronesis (PS, 35)." Moreover, in know-how, there is trial and error,  know-how learns to improve through its mistakes, "the one who is not ingrained in a  definite technique, a set routine, but again and again starts anew [becomes the most  proficient] (PS, 38)." Know-how wills the success as well as the failure, while  circumspection (insight) is either-or, there is no failing involved, ''phronesis is not  oriented toward trial and error; in moral action I carmot experiment with myself (PS,     96   38)."   (m) The Difficulty of Attaining Aletlieia   Heidegger indicates that pleasure and pain covers up what the proper being of  man is in such a way that man is no longer transparent to himself, with the result that  man can be the object of circumspection (insight) insofar as man is hidden from himself  and must be uncovered. Moreover, "A person can be concerned with things of minor  significance; he can be so wrapped up in himself that he does not genuinely see himself  Therefore, he is ever in need of the salvation of circumspection (insight).  Circumspection regarding himself and insight into himself must again and again be  wrested away by man (PS, 36)." As long as pleasure and pain [lupe - what depresses  one's disposition] are basic determinations of man, and if circumspection (insight) is not  employed the proper 'for the sake of which' that man's actions are directed to will not be  transparent, and since there is a constant tendency in man to cover himself up, the  process of uncovering must never end in order that the end toward which circumspection  (insight) aims, the good of man (anthropina agatha) is constantly in view.  Circumspection (insight) is not absolute for such an aim, since it can only be attained if  there is also action, as circumspection (insight) can only guide action. The person is  therefore imderstood in terms of potential because insofar as action need not be enacted  in accord with circumspection (insight), the action itself can indeed be otherwise.   Circumspection (insight) is different from science in that circumspection (insight)  requires life experience. Heidegger says that young people (he is thinking of Pascal) can  become wise in mathematics, but not in circumspection (insight). Heidegger cites     97   Aristotle point that "young people are not experienced in the factual conditions of  human Dasein itself (PS, 97)." Hence, young people can be accomplished  mathematically but not philosophically, as mathematics deals merely with abstractions. '*  Circumspection (insight) ultimately deals with the goal not of logos, but of nous -  where the discourse ultimately ends. With the Doctor, for instance, he deliberates with  the goal of making the patient healthy. At some point, the doctor will come to an  insight,'^ an aisthesis, a straightforward perception that shows him what he must do in  order to cure the patient, at which point there can be action. The outermost limit of the  deliberation is the eschaton, at which point the insight arrives, a straightforward  perception, the point at which we "see states of affairs as a whole (PS, 1 10)." This is the  same as in geometry where a polygon is resolved into a triangle, and the triangle is seen  as a simple whole. For the doctor it is never a question of whether to heal, since, as  Heidegger says, this is the meaning of his existence and hence already posited from the  outset. Another way to think of this is in terms of the futural structure of everyday  existence. We exist in such a way that we 'are' as though our own death will not be the  next actuality in our lives, as though there will be more time. This understanding of our  own death as 'later' is not an explicit theme for our everyday existence, it is the meaning  of it. The thing the doctor ultimately has in view is the point at which he can intervene.     '*We will return to the issue of the relation of Greek thinking to the child later.   "The notion of the insight follows, among other things, the Greek mathematicians. Heidegger  comments that "The Greek mathematicians did not understand axioms as fundamental principles. What  they had in mind can be seen in their paraphrase of the word: axiomata are koinai ennoiai. Plato used the  word often; it means 'insight,' 'to have an insight' and indeed with the mind's eye (PR, 15)..     98  In this regard, the nous of circumspection (insight) is different from that of wisdom in   that circumspection (insight) only deals with things in the here and now and hence with   things that could be otherwise. The deliberation that results in the insight about how to   treat the patient in front of us is entirely case dependent., and occurs "in the blink of an   eye, a momentary look at what is momentarily concrete, which as such can always be   otherwise. On the other hand, the noein in wisdom is a looking upon that which is aei,   that which is always present in sameness. Time (the momentary and eternal) here   frmctions to discriminate between the noein in circumspection (insight) and the one in   Sophia ... [SJophia is Dasein's positionality toward the beings of the world in the full   sense. Phronesis is Dasein's positionality toward the beings which are themselves   Dasein(PS, 113)."   Heidegger indicates that wisdom happens through theorein, which means that   there is no production involved in wisdom, but rather an idleness, a "not accomplishing   anything ... but a mere onlooking, a lingering with the object. (PS, 47)," that most   properly uncovers beings. The object of wisdom are those things which always are, aei   [the world, PS, 48], and hence cannot be otherwise. The objects of wisdom are obtained   through seeing, because seeing is the sense that allows for the greatest determinations of   things.   Seeing is thus preeminent among the senses in that 'it lets many differences be  seen'; seeing provides the greatest possibility for differentiating the things in their  manifoldness and orienting oneself within them. This privileged position of  horan is all the more remarkable in view of Aristotle's emphasis (b23) that  akouein is the highest aisthesis. But that is not a contradiction. Hearing is basic  to the constitution of man, the one who speaks. Hearing, along with speaking  pertains to man's very possibility. Because man can hear, he can learn. Both  senses, hearing and seeing, have, in different ways, a privilege: hearing makes     99   possible communication, understanding others; seeing has the privWege of being  the primary disclosure of the world, so that what has been seen can be spoken of  and appropriated more completely in logos (PS, 49)   I would like to relate this to what Heidegger says of hearing in his later thought. Hearing   attends to the call to the ground of beings, to pursue the essential and disregard the   trivial, and allows us to distinguish them as such. Moreover, while seeing is concerned   with major distinctions, hearing attends to subtle changes of tone, and is thereby able to   attend to emphasis. Heidegger can thus ask, in one place, "[w]hat tone is Parmenides   trying to set in letting us hear this resounding emphasis (EGT, Moira: Parmenides, 92)?"   Heidegger points out that since Plato, anything that 'is' can be differentiated into   two realms, the aistheton and the noeton, that which is apprehended by the senses and   that which can be experienced by nous, the mind's eye. The noeton is that which truly is   because it is not subject to the changeability of the things of the senses, and hence are   constant. The particular house shows the essence, hoiise as such, but only in a limited   way, and hence is me on, not simply nothing, ouk on, but deficient with respect to what   tiiily is, the primary image, ttie paradeigma (cf HHTI, 24). Aristotie was the first to   acknowledge that the actual beings we encounter everyday are real beings that need to be   passed through in order to reach the universal, so that we can then come back and fiilly   understand the particular, "it is necessary to press on, from what is in a single case   initially most familiar, to the arche and to appropriate the arche in such a way that fi'om   this apjM-opriation there takes place a genuine appropriation of the kathekaston   (particular) (PS, 62)." Wisdom is hard for Dasein, not because the matters to be   investigated are themselves overly convoluted, but because Dasein adheres to the     1(N)   immediate and hence the passing over of the immediate in order to get to the universal is   counter to the way in which Dasein nonnally is. Wisdom, as a mode of the being of   Dasein, arises from Thaumazein, wonder at something encountered, or negatively, as I   understand it, the unintelligibility of something encountered according to what one   already understands, one is not equal to the encounter.   Plato, in the 'Theatetus (155d2ff),' says wonder, thaumazein, is the origin of all   philosophy. Heidegger understands wonder as resulting from   "not knowing the way ... out of and into that which such knowing first opens up as an  untrodden and ungrounded 'space.' This space (time-space) ... is that 'between' where it  has not yet been determined what being is or what non-being is, though where by the  same token a total confrision and undifTerentiation of beings and non-beings does not  sweep everything away either, letting one thing wander into another. This distress, as -  such not knowing the way out of or into this self-opening 'between,' is a mode of  'Being,' in which man arrives or perhaps is thrown and for the first time experiences -  but does not explicitly consider - that which we are calling 'in the midst' of beings.  (BQP, 132)   This is not wonder at any particular thing, but that beings are as they are, beings as   beings, or rather beings as a whole, the Being of beings that shine through them.   Holderling says that the poet must grasp everything, not in the sense of systematically   trying investigate everything, but rather beings as such and as a whole. According to   Aristotle wonder proceeds from the simple things at hand, and goes to greater and greater   cases until it asks if beings as a whole are as they seem. Heidegger says that thaumazein   proceeds from aporein, from not being able to find your way through from which arises a   desire to get through to the matters as they actually stand. On the basis of this, for the   Greeks, who had a peculiar sense of being set over against things, namely, felt that 'not   being absorbed in things' that we outlined earlier, "what the Greeks call aporia     101  characterizes the peculiar intermediate position of Dasein itself over and against the  world (PS, 88)."  (IV) Deception   What I have said about the various ways of uncovering beings must now be  related to the ways in which they can be concealed to us, namely, to deception. In order  to see this, we will briefly re-visit the problem of the assertion. Heidegger says that  Logos has the character of speaking of something as something, or, more specifically, as  something else, such as saying the dog is grey or tall etc. The dog is determined in terms  of what it is not. It is hence related to dinoein, a thinking through, not noein. But as we  saw in the case oi circumspection (insight), noein occurred precisely when the thinking  through was at an end, when the discourse had ended and the doctor received the insight  about how to proceed, "[e]verything eschaton and everything /jro/on can be grasped  properly only if the noein is not a dianoein but a pure onlooking. Here the disclosure in  the mode of the carrying out of logos fails and recedes (PS, 124)." Gunter Figal  completely misreads the issue when he says Aristotle cannot get at the noein at all  because he only manages dianoein (cf , Refraining, 102)." Rather, Heidegger says that  dianoein in Aristotle is what pertains to the logos. In fact, Heidegger says quite explicitly  in Being and Time that "[t]he truth of aisthesis and of the seeing of 'ideas' is the  primordial kind of uncovering. And only because noesis primarily uncovers, can the  logos as dianoein also have uncovering as its function (BT, 269)." Hence, logos here is  understood as subservient to nous.   The 'insight' was not a determining something in terms of something else, but     102  rather a simple seeing of the whole. Logos, as Heidegger understood it in his early  thought, does not primarily uncover beings, but only the logos apophantikos does, since  it either reveals or distorts beings (pseudesthai), and even then not in a primary way.  There can be truth, uncovering in a judgement, but it need not be there, and hence it is  not contradictory for Aristotle to say at one place that truth is in the judgement and in  another that it can be said without relation to it. In fact, ^Logos, insofar as it possesses  the structure of apophainesihai, of 'something as something,' is so little the place of  truth that it is, rather, quite the reverse, the proper condition of the possibility of falsity a  (PS, 125)," that through the 'as' a deception can occur. How so?  (V) The Problem of Antisthenes   Heidegger points out that Antisthenes denied the possibility of addressing  something as something, or, more specifically, something as something else (cf  Aristotle's Topics A, chapter 11). In other words, Antisthenes denies the possibility of  addressing something in the form oikataphasis (affirmation) and apophasis (denial), in  the 'as' form, which also implies there can not be a contradiction, since a mere phasis  (showing) cannot be false. The only manner Antisthenes allows for addressing things is  by tautological naming, man is man. In this regard, Antisthenes denied the possibility of  delimiting the essential content of a thing in a definition, because the definition is  macros, containing many words, so it attempts to exhibit one thing in terms of many  things, in that the thing itself as a one is not addressed but rather is addressed in terms of  what it is not. This is what Heidegger says Aristotle accepted as the positive content of  Antisthenes thesis, that a being cannot be properly exhibited in a definition.     103  Falsity, thought in the Greek sense, is hepseudes, a deception, "it lets something  be seen as present, which is not present ... Thus it does not mean that a false logos  concerns that which is not at all fouk on], but rather it lets something not present be seen  as present ... In my speech I shove, in a certain sense, in from of what is there something  else, and I pass off what is there as something it is not, ie., as something that is not  present (PS, 349)." Heidegger gives the example of addressing a triangle as a circle.  Following what has been said, the circle is, so to speak, thrust in front of the triangle, and  I treat the triangle as though it is not there. 1 understand this to mean that in this sense, a  false proposition is deceptive, a fraud, false in the sense we speak of false money.  Moreover, "fljogos, even as legomenon, is, in the Greek sense, always oriented toward  being communicated, expressed for another person, so that the other person can  participate in the seeing. Insofar as the other, in the case of a deceptive logos, cannot  participate in the seeing, such a logos is not simply 'false,' but fraudulent (PS, 349)."  For Aristotle, the judgement is not so much an agreement of the judgement with the thing  but a letting be seen and a coimter-phenomenon of deceptive seeing, distortion. We shall  now make this more explicit.   The kind of logos under discussion, as Aristotle understands it, can have two  possibilities. It is either the definition that supposedly properly shows the being, or one  of the manifold determinations of beings, "[fjor in a certain sense every being coincides  with itself as itself and uath itself as it is qualified (PS, 350)." The latter manner is in a  sense derivative because it involves a synthesis, a joining together with that which  already is in itself with something it is not in itself I understand that the same dog is     104  intended whether we consider the dog in itself or in terms of its whiteness, the dog as  white. The deception is only possible in the latter case, because it is the joining of a  being with something that it is not intrinsically. Antisthenes, Aristotle says (cf  Metaphysics, V, chapter 28, 1024b32f ), believed only in addressing a being in the logos  proper to it because he did not distinguish between addressing the thing in itself and  addressing the thing 'as' something. For Antisthenes, a definition was not possible  because it did not, following what was said above, address the thing, and hence a  tautology, positing one and the same thing in relation to itself, was the only proper logos.  Hence, the addressing of something as something (else) is excluded in Antisthenes  doctrine. Plato, in the Sophist, called Antisthenes doctrine "the most laughable,  katagelastotata (252b8)," because it denied that something was to be understood by  appealing to something beyond the thing itself, while Antisthenes himself tacitly adopted  a whole slew of ontological structures that go beyond the mere entity at hand, such as  einai. Being, choris, separate from, ton allown, the others, and kath auto, in itself (also  cf N, 193). The addressing something as something, as a being, implies a  kataphasisapophasis, because it addresses a being in terms of what is beyond it, namely  its Being. Antisthenes tacitly goes beyond the being ontologically, to the Being ofhcings,  and hence understands the being as a being in its Being.   Aristotle said that in a judgement such as taking the table as black, there must be  a prior understanding of the unity, 'black table,' whereby the unity is then set in relief  against itself, 'table as black.' The 'as' is an 'as if because in setting them in relief, I  can then, through synthesis, co-positing them together, identify the table explicitly in     105  terms of its blackness, "as if they were one (PS, 126)." This synthesis oflFers the  possibility of deception, because it is then possible to posit something with the table that  does not belong to it, such as 'the table is white,' when it is in fact black. In this regard,  there belongs to both kataphasis and apophasis a diairesis and a synthesis, a taking apart  of the original whole and a putting them back together in the form of the as.   If a synthesis and diaresis thereby belong to a logos insofar as it is either  kataphasis or apophasis, the analysis of the judgement presented thus far has been  incomplete insofar as it has taken it orientation from statements that either affirm or  deny. But Heidegger says that if statements that affirm and deny are going to be possible  at all, there must be a fourfold condition already in place   "[1] if our representations and assertions -eg., the statement, 'The stone is hard'-  are supposed to conform to the object, then this being, the stone itself, must be  accessible in advance: in order to present itself as a standard and a measure for  the conformity with it [as the assertion has to adequate with the thing, then the  thing must already be available for the assertion to adequate with it]. In short, he  being, in this case the thing, must be out in the open. [2] Even more: not only  must the stone itself- in order to remain with our example - be out in the open but  so must the domain which the conformity with the thing has to traverse in order  to read off from it, in the mode of representing, what characterizes the being in its  being thus and so. [3] Moreover, the human who is representing, and who in his  representing conforms to the thing, must also be open [must be open, not in the  open]. He must be open for what encounters him, so that it might encounter him.  [4] Finally, the person must also be open to his fellows, so that, co-representing  what is communicated to him [by others] in their assertions, he can, together with  others and out of a being-with-them, conform to the same thing and, be in  agreement with them about the correctness of the representing ... In the  correctness of the representational assertion there holds sway consequently a  fourfold openness (BQP, 18-19).   This fourfold must hold sway, if there is to be a representational judgement, not simply   in its plurality, but most of all in the simple oneness of the four. Throughout this thesis   we found the need to see the relationship between the op)enness of beings and the     106   openness of man for beings. The final element is perhaps one of the most difficult to see,   not in terms of its content, but rather as to its necessity. One thing that Plato tried to do   was make philosophy accessible to everyone, and hence accused the ancients of having   not provided a logos, which in this case means something that was understandable to   everyone. He imderstood the logos explicitly as implying a being-with-others, which was   later carried over by Aristotle,   Logos as 'discourse' means rather the same as deloun: to make manifest what one  is 'talking about' in one's discourse. Aristotle has explicated this function of  discourse more precisely as apophainesthai. The logos lets something be seen  (phainesthai), namely, what the discourse is about; and it does so either ^or the  one who is doing the talking (the medium) or for persons who are talking with  one another, as the case may be ... makes this accessible to the other party (BT,  56)   As was said earlier, insofar as we make judgements about things, they are inherently   disputable, open to the possibility of falsity, which now means they can be deceptive.   Since disputation is a disputation with other, then others are already implied in our   discourse, especially if Being means, as it has throughout the tradition, being present-at-   hand. Moreover, the accessibility of the logos to everyone is one of the essential   elements of metaphysics, because it implies what is graspable by anyone, common,   which for Heidegger always means the commonplace.   Given what has been said, we can see that wisdom is more fully aletkeuein than   circumspection (insight) because it more properly 'accomplishes' than does   circumspection (insight). This is not because the philosopher's thinking actually results   in anything, but rather "Aristotle says that the philosopher's pure considering in fact   delivers something, poiei, and specifically 'by the very fact of having it and carrying it     107  out,' hence not by results but simply by the fact that I live this theorem (PS, 1 16)."  Aristotle compares wisdom to a healthy individual. For instance. Circumspection  (insight) is that which can restore a person to health. But what is even better is an  individual that is already healthy, for he "is healthy without further ado, ie., he simply is  what he is (PS, 1 17)." Wisdom is to be thought of in this way, it is the proper state of our  spiritual being. Wisdom, as tarrying along with that which is everlasting, is considered by  Aristotle to be the highest possibility of Dasein, and yet since man has all kinds of other  needs and desires, he cannot f)erpetually exercise his highest possibility. Nonetheless, as  wisdom is the pure onlooking upon that which never changes, then the looking itself  bears no alteration, "the possibility of a pure tarrying, which has nothing of the unrest of  seeking (PS, 120)."   For the Greeks, according to the nature of their existence, it was the general  unease of life that was misery (we will expand on this later), and so the opposite of it, the  absence of unrest, was therefore the highest good. For the most part, the various  comportments of man's life (be them in concern of prudence, justice, etc.) imply a  relation to others. Wisdom as the highest possibility of man, on the other hand, while it is  often helpful to have others to discuss with, is entirely focussed on the single individual  because in the disclosing of beings no one can have your insights for you. Philosophical  IDasein, if it is maintained over the whole of one's life by being understood as the proper  one, is a kind of deathlessness, athanatizein, since the comportment that relates to and  hence apprehends (the way in which the philosopher is-there with) the eternal, the  unchanging, must itself be unchanging, must not stray but tarry with the unchanging, and     108  hence in a sense is deathless (without cessation), since what is unchanging admits of no  passing away, "[hjerein resides the peculiar tendency of the accommodation of the  temporality of human Dasein to the eternity of the world ... This is the extreme position  to which the Greeks carried human Dasein (PS, 122)." Being-there in the sense that the  way you are there is a simple tarrying, a pure abiding, is eternal because it is a tarrying  along and an abiding with that which does not change, the eternal. In all its other  comportments, the human is never simply present at hand, because he/she always relates  to others and to things that are changeable. Here, however, man is ^'eudaimonia insofar  as it is simply present at hand with regard to its highest possibility of Being (PS, 123)."   Heidegger and Fink, in the Heraclitus seminar (which we will deal with later), re-  visit the notion of the philosopher as immortal for the Greeks. There is a dual  characterization. On the one hand, the restlessness of human existence is contrasted with  the peace of divine existence, and hence the two are radically separate. On the other  hand, the Philosopher is divine-like in that he does not suffer the restlessness of human  existence, "On one side an estrangement rules between gods and human; on the other  side, however, a clamping together also prevails (HS, 1 13)." Heidegger and Fink  characterize it in the following way (one should note here how Heidegger distinguishes  between existentiale and categories, against those who make the absurd claim in that in  Being and Time Heidegger is developing a system of ontological categories).   Fink: ... Gods and humans do not form two separated spheres. It depends on  seeing not the chohsmos [separation], but the intertwining of the godly and  human understanding of self and of being.   Heidegger: It is not a question of speaking in a blunt manner of gods and humans  as of different living beings, of whom the former are inmiortai and the other     109   mortal. Spoken in the tenninology of Being and Time, immortality is no  category, but rather an existentiale, a way that the gods relate themselves toward  their being.   Fink: The godly knowledge of the being bound to death of humans is no mere  consciousness, but rather an understanding relationship. With Athena, who  appears as mentor to mortals in order to bring help to them, it is perhaps a matter  of still another theme. The epiphany of the gods is no actual mortal being of the  gods, but a masking. When Aristotle says that the life of theoria [contemplation],  which exceeds phronesis [practical wisdom], is a kind of godly life, an  athanatizein [to be immortal] (whereby athanatizein is formed like hellenizein [to  be Greek]), that implies that in theoria we comport ourselves like immortals. In  theoria mortals reach up to the life of the gods. Correspondingly, we must say of  the gods, that their comportment toward humans is a thanatizein [to be mortal],  presupposing that one could form this word. The emphasis lies in this, that the  relationship of humans to gods carmot be described externally, but rather that they  themselves exist as their alternate and counter relationships, except that the gods,  to a certain extent, have the more favorable existenz - ontology and humans, on  the contrary, the less favorable (HS, 111).   We need to keep in mind here that this pure rejwse of theoria is specifically thought in   terms of that which allows the human being to be fiilly complete and at home. The   difference between the citation from the 1924 lecture course on the Sophist and the later   course on Heraclitus with Fink in relation to the problem of athanatizein is negligible. In   the earlier lective course, Heidegger has in mind the tarrying alongside of that which   always is without any regard for utility (since philosophy is useless in that sense). In the   latter lecture course Heidegger is thinking of the letting come to presence of that which   presences. In either case, we have pure theoria, the highest form of energeia as a putting   oneself to work without regard to machinations which brings a fullness and completeness   to one's life and one's lifetime. The key is that this notion of deathlessness or   etemalness (non-finiteness, if we can construct such a word), athanatizein, is not a   categorical determination of anything but rather an existentiale. It pertains to the being   of the person during his or her lifetime because, if you recall, for the Greeks the eternal     no   is also thought along with the lifetime of something as a whole thought in relation to the  time of the world. Because pure theoria is a relation to one's own being that is perfectio,  fiilly complete unto itself with none of the incompleteness or restlessness (deinon) that  pertains to the way a mortal relates to his or her being, the philosopher has the existence  ontology of a God. 'Theoria' in the Greek basically means: A\1iat makes someone whole.  This is possible in the Greek because the difference between the way the Gods and  mortals relate themselve to their own being is that the mortals become homless over  time.     Ill   CHAPTERS:  Deinon: The Utter Tragedy of Being-Human   Now that we have finished detennining the relation of the assertion to the Being   of man, we must expand on what was said of the fundamental attunement of Dasein in   order to determine presence as lustre. We will have the specific task here of determining   concretely how the notion of restlessness and its removal, which was raised in the last   section, is specifically related to the Greek understanding of existence.   (I) Anaximander   We shall begin with what Heidegger considered to be the oldest piece of actual   philosophy in the west, the Anaximander fragment. Taken literally, it reads   But that from which things arise also gives rise to their passing away, according  to what is necessary; for things render justice and pay penalty to one another for  their injustice, according to the ordinance of time   Heidegger says that this is generally imderstood to mean that things have their genesis,   and then they pass away, written with judicial language mixed in, because as early a   thinker as Anaximander was not yet privy to rigorous distinctions and hence simply used   the language of one domain in another interchangeably. It was thus that, later,   Theophrastus criticized Anaximander, since Anaximander mixed in language that did not   properly belong to the true beings, the beings of nature imderstood in the limited sense.   But was this criticism justified? Insofar as Anaximander is speaking of ta onta, beings,   and tapolla, the many, Anaximander is not interested in speaking of an indefinite   number of entities, but rather of being in its totality. What is properly understood as a   thing is not only the things of nature, but also man, his productions, the things and     112  situations effected by him (through action or inaction), and the divine are also things, but  considered raoxe fully so than just ordinary things.   Heidegger says that Theophrastus' accusation against Anaximander for  transposing the language from the realm of the judicial and ethical onto that of the realm  of nature is absolutely groundless, for it assumes an oversimplified picture of the  entirerty of what is, whereby beings are compartmentalized into their various domains,  the law related entities into their own and the natural entities into their own. However, if  it can be seen that entities are only given their full sense w^en it has been understood that  they dwell in Being, to wit the language of law belongs most essentially to the  description of the beings of nature, a very different understanding of Anaximander arises.  Heidegger comments that   where boundaries between disciplines do not appear, boundless indeterminacy  and flux do not necessarily prevail: on the contrary, an appropriate articulation of  a matter purely thought may well come to language when it has been freed from  every oversimplification (EGT, AF, 21)   Dastur provides a useful and, being one that Heidegger uses himself, highly   accurate account of how Heidegger's thoughts on Anaximander relate to the notion of   'presence' for the Greeks:   Homer declares that Calchas was the wisest of all seers because he knew what is,  was and will be. Ta eonta (later became the philosophical term onto) is here the  word for what is present {das Gegenwartige). But for us present means what is  now {das Jetzige), whereas for the Greeks it means what comes to presence {das  Anwesende) and not merely what stands "againsf {gegen) the "subject," as an  "object" {Gegemtand) ... Calchas the seer has the view of everything as coming  into presence, which means that his view is not restricted to what presently comes  into presence. He is "out of himself ' (Heid Anax,184)   In the oldest Greek sense of Being, that of Anaximander, Being hands to beings their     113   essences out of a fundamental enjoyment. It gives them their limits, not in the sense of   restriction, but fashioning them into what they really are. Dastur continues   To xrewn comes from the verb xraw, xraomai, whose origin is the word xeir  meaning "hand," and which originally signifies "to handle" something, to give a  hand to somebody or something. By giving Being the name to xrewn,  Anaximander means, according to Heidegger, that Being hands something to its  own essence and keeps it in hand, preserving it in this way in its truth, in its  coming to presence. Heidegger propose to translate to xrewn into the word  Brauch, which ordinarily means "use" or "need," but which has here to be taken  in its etymologically prior sense of "enjoyment." The old German bruchen is  related to the Latin ^w/. Enjoyment implies something else than a mere "need,"  in the sense that it does not involve the experience of lacking, but rather of an  originaiy profusion that is the very origin of the genesis of beings, of the "gift of  Being," of the Es gibt Sein (Heid Anax, 187).   Dastur, however, leaves the notion of presence unclarified, so that what he fimdamentally   understands here is unclear and makes it seem as though Heidegger is doing little more   than promoting a mysticism. This is especially the case because Dastur does not   concretize the relationship of presencing to the being of man. We must now consider   this more fully.   (II) Take Into Care Beings as a Whole   Heidegger points out that there is an ancient Greek saying, meleta to pan, "that   means, consider that everything depends upon the whole of beings, upon what addresses   humanity from there. Always consider the essential, first and last, and assume the   attitude that matures us for such reflection (BC, 3)." Essential does not mean here, as   has been suggested in all related occurrences throughout this thesis, merely the opposite   of the accidental, but rather the opposite of the trivial, "[hjistorical man matters only   when and insofar as he stands in relation to the essence of history and hears a claim from   this essence according to which what matters is distinguished from what doesn't matter     114  (BC, 17)." What matters is that beings as a whole speak to man insofar as they presence,  that is, have a lustre to which man is attracted. And yet, do to his general unrest, man is  never free, for he constantly strives after new in order to satisfy himself, and yet '"every  enough' is just as soon a 'never enou^' (BC, 4)." Man is characterized by a drive for  the new and a covering up of the old. It is my position that Heidegger, as we shall see,  will argue that only when man is in relation to the essential based on the call that comes  from the essential itself can man be free. In order to see this more fully, we must further  determine presence in relation to the being of man.   Heidegger says that "[b]eings are - thought in Greek - what presences. What  emerges [Heidegger's word here is Anaximander's genesis, coming into being] and  evades [phthora, passing away,] emerges into presence and goes out of presence (BC, 89-  90)." I believe that what is key to Anaximander's understanding of presencing is that it  is what is fit for a being precisely because, even though it emerges and lingers for a  while, beingness, that is, presence, is precisely what is not the eternal. Heidegger writes  that "[t]ransition is always presencing in which emergence and evasion [passing away]  presence above all (BC, 103)." Let us consider this in terms of time.   Time, understood in a Greek sense that had become archaic by Aristotle's time,  chronos, on the one hand means experienced time, and on the other it means 'it is time'  for something or other, the appropriate time for it. Experienced time was what we feel as  drawing out while we are waiting, which is analyzed by Heidegger (in FCM) in terms of  boredom, and also of the time a person has left, "in Homer chronos [time] means the  long, lingering time, the endurance of time understood in awaiting, or rather the time that     115  still remains for mortals who suffer long. Both are specific forms of time (HS, 61)." On  the other hand, a thing presences, lingers a while in its own time by overcoming an  absolute endurance that simply persists forever, since the eternal is 'the imfit ' that is  overcome in presencing. I understand this to mean the lustre of the thing that concerns  us is not an eternal lustre, but rather only that which concerns us for a time, whatever its  appropriate time is. For instance, if it 'is time for us to leave,' then the leaving is what  concerns us, has a luster in the sense that our attention is given over to it, but only for a  time.   As Presence is not what is eternal but has the character of lingering for a while in  its own time, we must now get a clearer understanding of how the Greeks thought it. We  will take our orientation from the Heraclitus seminar. In this seminar. Fink begins by  emphasizing 'light' for the Greeks in terms of a lighting up of things by lightning,  "[l]ightning, regarded as a phenomenon of nature, means the outbreak of the shining  lightning-flash in the dark of night. Just as the lightning in the night momentarily flashes  up and, in the brightness of the gleam, shows things in their articulated outline, so  lightning in a deeper sense brings to light multiple things in their articulated gathering  (HS, 5)." The sense here is that light has a visual connotation. Later in this seminar.  Fink speaks of light for the Greeks in the sense of the dawn sun arising over the water  and lighting everything up. This is an initial characterization, which, keeping with the  spirit of the seminar, is a characterization that he later retracts, since this preliminary way  of thinking of light in terms of the visual lighting of things is quite wrong, especially in  terms of Heraclitus, which is why Heidegger immediately warns "[a]t first, let us leave     116  aside words like 'clearing' and 'brightness.' (HS, 6)"   The light that the Greeks are concerned with is precisely not that which is visible   in the sense of being seen by anyone, for the masses do not see it at all, but rather a   radiance, a glory. Fink comments on Heraclitus fragment 29'* that   the noble minded prefer one thing rather than all else, namely everlasting glory  rather than transient things. The comportment of the noble minded is opposed to  that of the polloi, the many [people], who lie there like well-fed cattle ... But the  fragment expresses not only comportment of the noble minded in reference to  glory. Glory is standing in radiance. Radiance, however, reminds us of the light  of lightning and fire. Glory relates itself to all other things as radiance to  dullness. Fr. 90 also belongs here in so far as it speaks of the relationship of gold  to goods. Gold also relates itself to goods as radiance to dullness (HS, 22-3)."   Radiant presence for the Greeks is what is opposed to the ordinary in the sense of dull,   namely, presence is the uncanny, and for the Greeks the most uncanny is to deinon (cf   PR, 82). Hence, for the Greeks, it is not so much a question of physical light wliich lights   up the panta (beings as a whole), but a lustrous radiance. Even the ordinary presences,   insofar as it concerns us, but the uncarmy captures our attention more fully and hence is   radiant to a greater degree.   Heidegger himself sees all of this in relation to Pindar, which will be important   for us in a moment:   Fr. 29 also names the polloi next to the aristoi (the best). In Fr. 1, the polloi are  compared with the apeiroisin, with the untried, who are contrasted with ego, that  is, with Heraclitus ... The many do not strive, like the noble minded, after the  radiance of glory; they indulge in transitory things and therefore do not see the  one ... Pindar also connected gold, and thus the radiant, with fire and lighting  (HS, 22; also cf HS, 106-7).     ""There is one thing which the best prefer to all else; eternal glory rather than transient things";  Heidegger also treats this passage at IM, 103-4)     117   Fink: ... We have indicated that in chrusos [gold], the glimmer of gold must also  be thought. Here a relationship is thought between the light-character of fire and  that into which it turns...   Heidegger: We must think the radiant, the ornamental, and the decorative element  together in cosmos, which was for the Greeks a customary thought (HS, 1 16).   Hence, light is not simply the lighting up of things with a physical light, but also the   radiant light that is precisely what is invisible. '^ The understanding of light as the noble   and lustrous^" in the Greek follows, among older sources, Pindar's usage of the notion of   glimmering Gold, "'goldea' So that we may hear more clearly this word and what it   calls, let us recollect a poem of Pindar's: Isthmians V. At the beginning of this ode the   poet calls gold periosion panton, that which above all shines through everything, /?fl�/fl,   shines through each thing present all around. The splendor of gold keeps and holds   everything present in the unconcealedness of its appearing (PLT, L, 20 1 )."   Heidegger suggests that even later, in Plato's time, when Being became   interpreted as eidos and idea, it still carried the sense of a beautiful radiance, although at   that time the sense is ambiguous and hence the essence of truth becomes ambiguous. On   the one hand, Plato determined whatness, to ti einai, as what is constant in something   despite the various particular instances of it (house as such, for instance). For Plato, the   particulars are me on, not nothing, but deficient with respect to the imiversal because a   particular is not in the fullness of its possibilities but restricted to a particular form.^' It   is in relation to, for instance, the house that is seen in advance, that the other     "Especially in Fr. 54, aphanes, what "does not appear (HS, 82);" also cf HS, 143)   ^"Treated in PLT, L, 205; PR, 1 13   ^' On this the reader should refer to the treatment in BQP, especially at 63.     118  determinations (door, stairway) relevant to us can be understood as such. Heidegger   suggests that we do not involve ourselves specifically with the house as such, but it is   only because the house is seen in advance that "we experience and use this door as a   door, this staircase as a staircase to this storey with these rooms (BQP, 56)."^ This is the   first sense. On the other hand, Heidegger explains that "[t]he word '/cfea' comes fi-om   the Greek eido which means to see, face, meet, be face to face ... [E]ach of us has at   some time stood facing a tree in bloom ... Or did the tree anticipate us, so that we might   come forward face-to-face with it? Standing before us a blossoming tree in all its   radiance and fragrance - when we perceive it (WCT, 41-2)." The ambiguity is that in   Plato's time it is uncertain whether it should be decided that the lighting is the light of   the idea for the mind's eye of the cognizing thinker or the radiant lighting of the things   themselves^^; the ambiguity also being present in Heraclitus' treatment of radiant glory. ^^   In the 'Republic (517b7-c5)' the idea of the good is that which is the source of the  lighting of things. However, in one sense it is the source of the knowable, and hence in     ^^ Another example Heidegger gives which further illustrates how what is seen in advance  determines our understanding of something, peiiiaps better shows the phenomenon precisely when there is  a problem. During the first world war, it was reported that a certain fort had been tdcen, and looking  through binoculars at the fort it was confiraied that fiiendly soldiers were indeed perched on the wall and  friendly flags were flying. The outcome was disastrous because the fort was later approached as though it  was friendly, and it turned out the fort had not actually been taken, but that the person looking through the  binoculars saw friendly flags and soldiers because he had seen them there in advance - since he had been  previously told ihsy were there. The initial mistake "became the hupokeimenon for the apparmdy  'incorrect' seeing (BQP, 60)."   ^^Aletheia as homoiosis or, on the other hand, aletheia kai on - unconcealedness, that is to say,  beings in their beingness (BQP, 106; also cf PA, PDT, 177-8).   "Most specifically at IM, 103-4.     119  this case truth is understood in terms of the knowing of correct things, ortha, and in the  other case truth has the sense of unhiddeness and in this respect refers not to the correct,  but to the beautiful, kala, that A\1iich is" ekphanestaton, "that which, as most of all and  most purely shining of an from itself, shows the visible form and thus is unhidden (PA,  PDT, 1 78; also at Nl, 80)." Referring to Plato's Phaedrus, Heidegger says that beauty is  "what is most radiant and sparkling in the sensuous realm, in a way that, as such  brilliance, it lets Being scintillate at the same time (Nl, 197)."   Heidegger suggests that for Plato, there is the further ambiguity that Being is  understood univocally. The problem here is that if Being is univocal and the various  things that are must presence in some way, then the distinction between the prescencing  and that which presences collapses. This can perhaps better be understood in the  following way: Aristotle said that Being cannot be equivocal (homomtmos) or univocal  {sunonumos), but is rather analogical. Being is quite obviously not equivocal. On the  other hand, it cannot be, as Plato said, genus like, univocal, because the genus is what is  common to many, which must then be differentiated into species. The genus cannot be  included in what defines any of the species, for otherwise it would not be the genus.  Heidegger gives the example of rationality, the determination of humans, as being  included in the genus 'living thing.' In that case, plants, if they are living, would have to  be rational. If Being were a genus and the different ways of being, such as being true and  being possible were species, then insofar as these ways are something rather than not, the     ^'It is notable that Heidegger takes his orientation on the beautiful from the Phaedrus, not the  Syqsposium, which will be important for us in the conclusion.     120  genus would have to be included in the species, which is impossible. Being, rather, is  analogous. Health, for instance, is what is understood in general in something that  possesses that condition (dehikon), or else something that produces health (poiein), or  something that is an indication of health (semeion einai), or else something that is  conducive to the recovery of health {phulatteiri). What is seen here is that while 'health'  is general it is not said of the various kinds in the same way, and so is not a genus.  Rather, in all the different cases health is co-intended, and hence thought analogously,  that is, one thinks the various kinds of health and thinks 'health as such' at the same  time. Let us consider this another way. It caimot be the case, for instance, that 'essence'  goes out to both 'essence of kind' in the sense of a commonality of many things and  'essence of Socrates' in the same way, since the latter only goes out to one person.  'Essence' in these cases is not intended in the same way. But if being is analogical, we  must try to understand this in terms of the difficult problem of presence.   Brogan indicates that Ousia must be understood according to the fact that the  categories have being only insofar as they "belong together in the unifying presencing of  a being as a whole ... [Aristotle's primary task in this sense of being, then, is to] think  how this manifold can belong to a being without contradicting the oneness, the en that  characterizes the being of beings (Twofoldedness, 1 14)."  (ED) Presence   The presence of the work of art is precisely a self-showing radiance, while the  notion of a standstill, or production, if they are there at all, are entirely secondary.  Because the notion of presence is ambiguous here, so too is the relation of presence to     121  beings. The analogy by virtue of which beings are in being is that of the presencing of   beings specifically in the lustrous radiance, so that the shining is there with the beings,   para. But this para is not an empty academic distinction, or some vacuous notion of   'beside,' but a 'nearness.' Let us consider this.   Fink quotes from Holderlin's Hyperion's Song of Fate in order to characterize   how existence was for the Greek people. One has to be careful with this passage because   Fink prompts it with a warning that the relationship expressed here between the Gods and   mortals is not what Heraclitus is dealing with in Fr. 62. Care is needed because this   prohibition is not meant to say that Holderlin is characterizing the Greeks incorrectly,   only that the strict separation between mortals and Gods in Holderlin's poem is different   than the belonging together of them in the Heraclitus fragment, and thus Fink later says   that he only meant to understand that relation (cf HS, 103), later accepting Holderlin's   characterization.^* Hence, in this characterization of Greek life, Holderlin says the   following:   Radiant the gods' mild breezes/Gently play on you/ As the girl artist's fingers/On  holy strings. - Fateless the Heavanly breathe/Like an unweaned infant  asleep;/Chastely preserved/In modest bud/For even their minds/Are in flower/ And  their blissful eyes/Eternally tranquil gazeyEtemally clear. - But we are fated/to  find no foothold, no rest,/ And suffering mortals/ Dwindle and fall/ Headlong  from one/ Hour to the nextyHurled like water/From ledge to ledge/Downward for  years to the vague abyss. (HS, 101)   Fink, commenting on the meaning of the passage, says the following, "the gods wander     ^*Hence he says, on the strict separation between the Gods and mortals in Holderlin's poem as  opposed to their mutual belonging togetiier in the Heraclitus fragment. Fink later says "On one side an  estrangement rules between gods and humans; on the other side, however, a clamping together in mutual  understanding (HS, 113)."     122   without destiny, their spirit eternally in bloom, while humans lead a restless life and fall   into the cataract of time and disappear." (HS, 101 )   Heidegger and Fink introduce the notion of light and the bright with wakefulness   in this seminar, vdiich has to do with being absorbed in what you are doing. Heidegger   says that "we sometimes call a wakeful human a bri^t, lively one. His attention is   directed toward something. He exists in that his bearings are directed toward   something." (HS, 132) Fink takes up this notion of wakefulness in order to do a   phenomenological analysis of sleep and dreaming in relation to the Heraclitus fragments.   As always, a bifurcated notion of the person is presented, where in the dream state the   person is ekstatic with respect to himself as, on the one hand, the dreamer, and on the   other, the dreamed 'I.' The dream itself specifically brings out the element of 'concern'   in human existence, being absorbed by it.   Fink: In dreaming, we must distinguish the one who dreams and the dreamed I.  When we speak of a light in the dream, this light is not for the dreamer, but rather  for the dreamed I of the dreamed world. The sleeper, or the sleeping I, is also the  dreaming I, who is not the I of the dream world who is awake and sees in the  dreams. In the dream world, the I of the dream world behaves similarly to the  wakeful I. While the dreaming I sleeps, the dreamed I of the dream world finds  itself in a condition of wakefulness. What is important, however, is that the light  of the dream world is a light not for the dreaming and sleeping I, but for the  dreamed I. The I of the dream world can have different roles and vary in it self-  relatedness. A phenomenological analysis of the dream indicates that not the  sleeping, but the dreamed I kindles a light. Although the sleeper does not see,  still, as a dreamer, he has a dreamed I that has encounters  Heidegger: Thus one cannot identify sleeping and dreaming.  Fink: Sleeping is a vivid form of human absorption. (HS, 137)   Of course, we cannot equate the sleeping I with the dreamed I, for otherwise it would not   be possible, as occasionally happens, that the dreamed I becomes aware that it is in the   dreamed world, that it is a dreamed I and not an actual I that is awake, and therefore     123  becomes aware, in a peculiar way, of that other, the dreaming I asleep in the bed. Notice,  further, how the ekstatic structure of human life speaks further than the intentional  structure consisting merely of the intentio and intentum. For, if we merely adhere to the  intentional structure, then all there can be is the dreamed I as intentio and dreamed world  as intentum, but no sleeper. In regular life, the ekstatic dimension shows itself in the  dynamism between absorption and indifference.   We do not only relate to things in such a way that we are utterly engrossed by  them, but there is also, either subtly or explicitly a not-being-there, a being away, so that  the lustre of that which we are interested in, that in relation to which we are awake,  wakeful, is always, as we say in English, including of a kind of lackluster along with it,  "Being awake is, in its tautness, suffused by the possibility of the sinking away of tension  and the extinguishing of all interest (HS, 147)." In this regard, if the discussion of the  relation of sleeping and being awake in the Heraclitus fragments is taken in an average  way as indicating the factual state of consciousness and unconsciousness, then. Fink says,  "the human situation, aimed at (in my opinion) in the fi'agment, of standing between light  and night gets lost." (HS, 138)   Heidegger suggests that humans are, as is clear, "not related only to what is  immediately present, to what lies before them in their grasping apprehension. Fink cites  the example of Plato in the Laws which discusses hope. The captivation that might  usually be directed toward the things at hand are projected into the future. Hence,  Heidegger says that "Hope means 'to concern oneself with something very intensely'  ( 1 52)." In order to make it clearer to ourselves how the radiance of the beautiful and the     124  Greek notion of the ekstatic are related, we shall consider Parmenides.  (IV) Parmenides   Although Heidegger nowhere says this, 'the same,' as Parmenides understood it,  seems, as we shall see, to be the 'at the same time' tense of the participle, which was  emphasized earlier in this thesis, although it is not. Parmenides' 'same' is the sameness  of the matter of thought. It bears an identical character to Heidegger's use of 'the same'  in the following passage, "Plato's definition of the nature of thought is not identical with  that of Leibniz, though it is the same. They belong together in that both reveal one basic  nature, which appears in different ways (WCT, 165)."   I would suggest that the notion of simultaneity, 'at the same time,' is perhaps the  primary notion in philosophy. There is, for instance, a being, and at the same time the  Being of that being. A being is determined, for instance, in terms of its essentia, and at  the same time, its existentia. Both of these, at the same time, possess both a primary and  a secondary sense. Essentia is both the what of something generally, its various  accidental determinations, and at the same time what it is essentially. Existence, taken in  the classical understanding of it, is both the various manners and ways of its being, as  well as the primary sense 'that it is.' In speaking of the principle of contradiction, we say  that the 'what' and 'how' of something cannot both be and not be at the same time}''  Heidegger identifies the 'turning' that occurs in this doubling of the at-the-same-time-  ness, the turning that always involves a turning to something (eg. essence) that is at the     " Kant was the first to dispute that simultaneity should be placed as a determination of the  principle of contradiction, cf Heidegger's 'What is the Thing?, but, as we shall see, located it elsewhere.     125  same time a turning away from that something (eg. existence) in a belonging together.^  For example, in dealing with the 'at-the-same-time-ness' of the essence of truth and the  truth of essence, one of the myriad of 'at-the-same-time' determinations, Heidegger says   [a]ll this is enigmatic: the question of the essence of truth is at the same time and  in itself the question of the truth of essence. The question of truth - asked as a  basic question -turns in itself against itself This turning, which we have now run  up against, is an intimation of the fact that we are entering the compass of a  genuine philosophical questioning ... [T]he turning must belong essentially to the  single focus of philosophical reflection (Being as the appropriating event  [Ereignes]"") (BQP, 44)."   The point is that if we only ask about the essence of truth and do not think what is, at the   same time, thought along with it, then "we are only half asking; from a philosophical   standpoint, we are not questioning at all (BQP, 51)." But why should we he persuaded to   identify this in the ftmdamental thought of Parmenides?   Heidegger comments that "eon [Parmenides older an more genuine form of   Aristotle's to on], has two different meanings ... The grammatical name ...for words so   formed is participle. They participate, they take part - in two meanings ... The word   blossoming can mean: the given something that is blossoming - the rosebush or apple   tree. If the word is intended in this sense it designates what stands in bloom ... In its     ^* especially and most explicitly in the companion lecture course to 'Contibutions to Philosophy,'  namely, 'Basic Questions of Philosophy: Selected Problems of 'Logic,' as where the heart of philosophy  resides (cf BQP, esp. 44).   ^'I leave the translation of Ereignes here as the translators of the lecture course do because turning  has a temporal context, a tumiag within the 'at-the-same-///we,' and so allotting the term 'event' to  Ereignes conveys that there is a temporal happening. The point of the notion of Ereignes is that when ever  we try to delimit what is ownmost in something (the essence of truth, for instance), we inevitably turn  away from it and must think what is thought along with it (in this case the truth of essence), which means  that thinking never completes itself, but rather moves in a circular way, is an event, that is, continually  self'perpetuating.     126  linguistic form, it has the character of a substantive, a noun (WCT, 220)." The   participle, as a verbal adjective, is being emphasized in its adjectival form, and the   adjective is being taken substantively. In other words, what the thing is, is being derived   from what the things does. On the other hand, we say, for instance, that the man is   running down the road. In this case, the participle 'running' is being thought of more in   the verbal sense. If we put the two together and say, for instance, the nmning man   [runner] is sweating profusely, the temporal determination of simultaneity is buih in to it.   Became the substantive form can only de-emphasize, but not eliminate, the temporal   sense, it has a time bearing just as the verbal sense does. Hence, if we ask when the   runner is sweating, the answer is that he is sweating at the same time he is running. The   Greek eon, as it participates in both the substantive and the verbal, expresses   simultaneity by its very nature. What is the consequence?   Parmenides said "that, namely the same, is thinking as well as being." The   'same' here could, especially following the closeness of the Greek language to express   simultaneity in the participle form, mean that thinking and being are at the same time,   and hence be the initial expression of this fundamental temporal determination of   philosophy. Kant, as was said, took, simultaneity out of the definition of the principle of   contradiction, but re-inserted it back into the highest principle of all synthetic   judgements, "[t]he conditions of the possibility of experience in general are at the same   time conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience (cited Heidegger, WCT,   243)." As Heidegger says, 'at the same time' is Kant's interpretation of Parmenides'   word 'tauto, same.' Heidegger says, though, that Parmenides 'same' is not the 'at the     127  same time' that Kant read into it, pregnant as such a reading may be in the Greek  language. Heidegger understands Parmenides' 'same' to be identical with the sense that  was expressed earlier about the sameness of Plato and Leibniz (cf WCT, 165), namely,  the sameness of the matter to be thought. Heidegger translates Parmenides saying in the  following way, 'for the same: taking-to-heart is also presence of what is present,' or,  thought according to the interpretation we are putting forth of presence, ' to the matter  that calls for thinking there belongs a concern as well as the lustre of that which is to be  thought. ' Hence, Heidegger concludes "[t]hough Kant says something absolutely >  different [from Parmenides], his thinking moves nonetheless in the same (not identical)  sphere as the thinking of the Greek thinkers (WCT, 243)."   Just as the logos of Heraclitus, as we shall soon see, as legein, is primarily that  which concerns us, so too is the noein of Parmenides, which is why Heidegger says  Parmenides and Heraclitus agree in their basic position. Noein is a perception, not in the  sense of a mere gaping perception, but rather "what is perceived concerns us in such a  way that we take it up specifically, and do something with it ... We take it to heart (WCT,  203)." What philosophers take up in their concerned thought is 'the same,' that is, the  luster of that which calls for thinking. This is why Greek thinking is metaphorical, and  not because, as is so prevalent today, they had a lazy recourse to an etymological  dictionary, as though the descriptive (ontic) fact that some ancient people used the same  words for what we now call objective things and subjective things and, moreover, that for  the Greeks with their inexplicable preference for 'light' metaphors, thinking was a  perceiving, that because of this something essential about our being was somehow     128  thereby magically established. Such questionable movements proceed from the  assumption that there is somehow already a subjective side and an objective side and  then, inexplicably, there is metaphor, one side is somehow carried over to the other. ^  The entire theory of the metaphor here is torn utterly asunder if one simply proceeds  from the other direction and, instead of asking why it is that Greeks used objective terms  to describe subjective states, that it is asked why it is that the Greeks used subjective  terms to describe objective states. If one cannot assume the primacy of the subject/object  dichotomy and is not allowed to start from one side of that dichotomy, much of what is  currently bandied about in the guise of philosophy turns out to be nonsense, the last  resort of those who thought they found a way to establish an absolute ground for  themselves so that they would no longer have to think.   Heidegger suggests that if for the Greeks thinking was merely a perceiving, then  this is the equivalent of saying they saw no difference between people and animals.  Rather, thinking is a perceiving because perceiving is, at the same time, a thinking. In  perception, there is no indifferent gaping, but rather an attending to something, namely,  what attracts the eye. When we speak of someone as attractive, as having a kind of lustre  or radiance about them, we mean they attract our attention. In attraction there is a  pursuing, and so too does the eye not simply gloss over what attracts it but pursues it.     ^It is often suggested that this is what Heidegger was ultimately aiming at, as though he were  Hegel and trying to rehash romanticism. One must considCT, though, that no one fought more stringently  against the dichotomy of the objective and the subjective and that, for the older Greeks, there is no such  thing as a metaphor.' In our time there is often recourse to cognitive science, and neural discoveries,  such as the fact that there is a great deal of interconnective material between the various sensory areas of  the brain, in order to try to 'prove' that a metaphorical Unguistics will estabUsh philosophy as a real  science. Such things are little more than rhetoric.     129  focuses on it and, as the common parlance says, 'gives it a once over.' This is so whether  we factually see them in front of us or not. In fact, our attention is often most attracted to  them when they are not there. In our language we say 'absence makes the heart grow  fonder,' or perhaps 'go yonder,' if we are not attending to them in their absence. For  thinking it is also the case that we are directed, not indifferently, but rather to what calls  for thinking, what attracts our thinking to pursue it further. In perceiving and in thinking  there is, therefore, a relation to the beautifiil, that which in its lustrous radiance shows  itself   In order to fully appreciate what Heidegger saw in Being as beautifiil radiance for  the Greeks, we must approach the Beautifiil in accord with what the Greeks meant by the  word ekstatikon, which has been deah with at certain junctures throughout this thesis.  Heidegger's revival of the Greek notion of the ekstatikon (ecstatic), the being outside  oneself, is not meant merely as an attempt to be innovative with respect to the thinking of  his time, but rather to bring out the essential determination of man. Aside from other  instances of it, this being outside oneself is clearly seen in anger,   "[a]nger comes over us, seizes us, 'affects' us. Such a seizure is sudden and  tiirbulent. Our being is moved by a kind of excitement, something stirs us up,  lifts us beyond ourselves, but in such a way that, seized by our excitement, we are  no longer masters of ourselves. We say, 'he acted on impulse,' that is to say,  under the influence of an affect. Popular speech proves to be keen sighted when  it says of someone who is stirred up and acts in an excited manner, 'He isn't  altogether himself When we are seized by excitement, our being 'altogether  there' vanishes; it is transformed into a kind of falling apart. We say [at other  times of someone that] [h]e's beside himself with joy (Nl, 45-6).   This seizure bears within it two elements, the being seized of the human and the seizing  itself by     130   that ^\1iich is lustrous in the sense of that which captures the attention of the person.   This being outside of ourselves whereby feelings do not just pertain to our lives as   internal phenomena can also be seen from the point of view of the body, such as when   we have stomach problems.   When our stomachs are 'out of sorts' they cast a pall over all things. What would  otherwise seem indifferent to us suddenly becomes irritating and disturbing; what  we usually take in stride now impedes us ... [FJeeling is not something that runs  its course in our inner lives! It is rather that basic nature of our Dasein by force  of which and in advance with which we are already lifted beyond ourselves into  beings as a whole, which in this or that way matters to us or does not matter to us.  Mood is never merely a way of being determined in our inner being for ourselves.  It is above all a way of being attuned, in this or that way of mood. Mood is  precisely the basic way in which we are outside ourselves. But that is the way we  are essentially and constantly (N 1 , 99).   Again we see here the opposition between indifference and that which concerns us.   Hate and love, are another kind of being-outside-oneself where a specific  gathering function is involved, that is, our outsidedness is gathered back into itself This  does not happen so that we then regain some kind �firmer solipsism, but rather our  being- with-beings completes itself, so it is no longer a question of an inside or an outside  ofoneself (cfNl,49)   When something so concerns us so, either in love or hate, we say in English that it is our   'thing,' it is what matters to us in a pre-eminent sense, it gathers our existence together in   the sense that our whole life evolves around it.   The thing is that which concerns us, that which we care about, not only trivially,   but also something that brings cohesion to our lives in a pre-eminent sense, such as when   we speak, in love, about someone who is the entire world to us, for she is the pole^'   around which everything else in our lives turn, because she's the thing, she's what really   matters:     31     This is the sense that polis as a pole has in the Greek.     131   "The Roman word res designates that which concerns somebody, ... that which is  pertinent, which has a bearing ... In Enghsh 'thing' has still preserved the full  semantic power of the Roman word: 'He knows his things,' he understands the  matters that have a bearing on him ... The Roman word res denotes what pertains  to man, concerns him and his interests in any way or manner. That which  concerns man is what is real in res ... Thus Meister Eckhart says, adopting an  expression of Dionysius the Areopagite: love is of such a nature that it changes  man into the things he loves (PLT, T, 175-6)."   Heidegger says that the thing things, it gather. The sense here is not, in relation to the   thing, an entity is dispersed into the totality of its relations or that a man is something   similar to this, but rather the opposite, that in love for his 'thing' man is less himself and   more at home as the thing (does not disperse itself but rather) gather the totality of its   relations, including the man, into a unity. Metaphysics, as the name implies, has man   passing over beings to get to being, but he precisely then does not find it. Only when   man is captured by a being do the tables turn, "[metaphysical] thinking goes beyond   beings ... [, and precisely in this] philosophy distances itself from the truth ... The less a   being man is and the less he insists upon the being which he finds himself to be, so much   nearer does he come to being (No Buddhism! The opposite) (CTP, 120, bracketed remark   in original)." Things in this sense of this word, compared to the endless number of   objects, are rare (cf PLT, T, 182).   I would suggest that, in fact, it is only when we are not locked up into ourselves   (which is never complete anyway), that we accrue to the true realization of our human   being, when we stand in relation to that which dissolves our concern for ourselves. This   is what Heidegger saw in the 'beautiful.' When I truly find the beautiful, it is never in   relation to any needs that I have for its use, "in order to find something beautiful, we   must let what encounters us, purely as it is in itself, come before us in its own stature and     m   worth ... [This is] the supreme effort of our essential nature, the liberation of ourselves  for the release of what has proper worth in itself ... in order that we may have it purely  (Nl, 109)." This is what Kant and Nietzsche also saw as the essence of the beautiful.   In relation to this, we may now more fully concretize Heidegger's understanding  of the person by connecting what has been said to the Zollikon seminars. In the Zollikon  seminars from 1959-1969, where Heidegger attempted to explain his thinking to the  Swiss Psychiatrist Medard Boss and his colleagues, a distinction is drawn between  Heidegger's theory of the person and Freud's. The point on which the whole position  turns is the development of a theory of Dasein or being-there in which the person is  understood in such a way that they are not just another present-at-hand object.  Specifically, Heidegger wanted a theory of humanity that did not try to explain the  person causally. Freud, for instance, presented his theory of parapraxes or slips of the  tongue causally, in terms of underlying drives or forces that were the cause of the  phenomenon. The effect is explained by the cause and the cause is proved via the effect,  although not manifest in itself It is a theory that deals in terms of proof Heidegger, on  the other hand, advocated a theory of the person that was not one dependent on proof, but  the assertions of which are traced back to a ground that is a simple showing - Heidegger  gives the example of the manifestness of your own existence, even if it caimot be proved.  One sees both the existence of something, and its real predicates, although the real  predicates are seen in an ontic maimer (eg. Perception of square, hard, etc.), while the  existence of the table is seen in an ontological manner, alreatfy seen in advance, insight  (Einsehen) (cf Z, 6-8).     133   The difference between the ontic and the ontological can also be thought in the   manner of the appearance of beings, and it is particularly helpful here because it brings  out a special dimension of the person and the ontological. What is not seen perceptibly,  but rather in advance, is difficult because it is not seen in the same that we see the ontic,  and hence we feel that we have cause to doubt it. However, and this is one of the core  insights of Heidegger's thinking, the ontological can be made manifest or forced out of  its hiding place when steresis or privation is brought in relation to things. We spoke of  this earlier in relation to the presen-at-hand, but we now need to being it into relief as the  more general case. Space, for instance, is 'seen' in advance, and it is seen in advance as  the open and the free, as opposed to the table that is seen in space. Space is the pervious  which allows the table to show itself We see this in privation, for instance, when a wall  is put between the table and the observer, since space is no longer the pervious that  allows the showing of the table, but instead the wall is able to show itself, (cf Z, 8). On  the other hand, this wall does not prevent the person from still being with the table, since  they can still locate it in its place. There is a clearing (Lichtung) with respect to people  and things to the effect that the things can show themselves to the person who is oriented  toward them, which has nothing to do with whether the light is on or not. Hence,  Heidegger suggests, we can quite readily bump into something whether the room is lit or  not. The human being is 'in space' in a different way than the object he or she percieves.  They are simultaneously situated in a certain spot, and at the object they are perceiving  (both here and there, while the object does not have this spatial duality).   The non-causal theory of the person extends to a notion of a person that is not     134   simply an empty ego that, aside from this, has various states, but rather the states that a   person has is not distinguishable from the the manner in which the person has them. In   the case of anxiety, Heidegger does not allow an empty 'having ego' that has a particular   state of anxiety which is somehow different from it, but rather dissolves the essential   nature of anxiety into an existential modification of being-there, and nothing more:   I am anxious. It makes me anxious, not because I am making myself anxious, but  because anxiety overcomes me. What about 'having' in such a case of having  anxiety? The having itself, and just that, is full of anxiety. Anxiety is located just  in that having. The having is being in a state of anxiety. No, anxiety in itself is  this state we find ourselves in... [A]nxiety is not simply what is had, but is really  the having itself [IE. The uncomfortable being overcome]. There is no anxiety  one can have, but there is having as being in such and such a state, an ontological  [since it refers to being, existentia, the manner in which one is] disposition that is  called anxiety. (Z, 63)   (V) The Deinon.   Presence, as the Greeks understood it, really had nothing to do with the gleam of  the sun off of things, but, as has been said, with a kind of invisible lustre. In a context  unrelated to the present discussion, Naas cites an instructive passage from Heidegger's  untranslated Zur Frage nach der Bestimmung der Sache des Denkens, "Heidegger recalls  a passage from the Odyssey (16. 161) in which Athene appears as a young woman to  Odysseus and his son Telemachus though only Odysseus can see that she is Athene, for  as the poet says ... 'it is not to all that the gods appear enargeis. Odysseus and his son  Telemachus both see the young woman before them but only Odysseus apprehends the  presencing of the goddess.' Such presencing, according to Heidegger, is to be  understood as 'Shining of one's own accord,' a characteristic to things themselves in  their presencing (PAH, Keeping Homer's Word, 81)." But it is unclear for us at this     13f   point what presence has to do with the being of man.   In a famous passage from Homer, which is usually translated so as to suggest  mortals are wretched because they die, Krell translates more literally: Apollo says '"Why  should I do battle for the sake of mere mortals!' exclaims the sun god, 'mortals, who are  as wretched as the leaves on the trees, flourishing at first, enjoying the fruits of the earth,  but then, deprived of heart (akerioi), vanishing (1, 21, 464-66) ... Vanishing how?  Akerioi, as ... those who are deprived of [heart] (PAH, Kalypso, 105)." Leaving aside  Krell's thoughts on this, which do not bring out what is essential, the sense of the passage  is not that of the wretchedness of existence because mortals die, but rather enjoyment  and fruition are contrasted with a losing heart {Akerioi) over time. This is in line with  the ways the Greeks understood the passage from youth where one is transfixed on the  lustre of life, which later none-the-less fades with age.   In order to get a hold of what is at issue here, we will now determine how, in the  oldest sense, deinon, the uncanny, for the Greeks can mean the unhomely, and then later  pursue the determination into its culmination in Sophocles. In Homer, Kalypso is the  deine theos, the uncanny Goddess (O, 7, 246), and is understood as preventing Odysseus  fi-om returning home. This is why Heidegger can understand the deinon as opposing the  homely in the Greek. Athena says "[i]t is Laertes' son, whose home is in Ithaca. I have  seen him on a certain Island, weeping most bitterly: this was in the domains of the nymph  Kalypso who if keeping him with her there and thwarting return to his own country (fi-om  Odyssey, IV, 549-643).   It is well known, and Heidegger has been often attacked for his reading of the     136   Odyssey (cf. EGT, Heraclitus, Aletheia, 107). Heidegger speaks of a concealment with   resjject to Odysseus, in relation to the Odyssey Theta 93, when Odysseus covers his head   with his mantle to sob after the singer Demodokos tells of the tragedy that happened to   the Greeks at Troy, which is generally translated as 'But then he (Odysseus) shed tears,   without the others noticing it (elanthane), Alkinoos alone was aware of his sorrow.'   But, grammatically, elanthane does not bring out the sense of others looking at Odysseus   and failing to see his tears, but rather the concealment of Odysseus himself The German   philologist Voss, in his variation of the translation, renders elanthane as "To all the other   guests he concealed his flowing tears (cited at P, 23)," emphasizing the concealment in   relation to Odysseus, not the others gaping at Odysseus, which is closer to what the   Greek says. Heidegger, however, goes ftulher. What Heidegger tries to bring out when   he speaks of Odysseus in terms of concealment is that there is, in general, a concealment   around him that isolates him, cuts him off from others, an imhomeliness that surrounds   him - a point that has not been sufficiently seen in the secondary literature, although it is   doubtful that any of the commentators have sufficiently understood Heidegger on this   point. ^^ Heidegger brings this all out quite clearly when he says   In the case of the weeping Odysseus, the Greeks do not consider that the others  present, as human 'subjects' in their subjective comportment, fail to notice the  crying Odysseus, but they do think that round about this man and his existence  there lies a concealment causing the others present to be, as it were, cut off fi-om  him. What is essential is not the apprehension on the part of the others but that     ^^Naas (96, n. 8) agrees with Heidegger's grammatical understanding of conceahnent in relation to  Odysseus, but thinks it has to do with Alkinoos being the only one noticing Odysseus. Naas is clearly  wrong, because there is no way that Heidegger's grammatical point can be accepted and then contend that  the concealment has anything to do with whether Odysseus is being noticed by others or not. The  concealment refers to Odysseus, not to Odysseus in relation to the looks of others.     137   exists a concealment of Odysseus, now keeping the ones who are present far from   him (P, 27-8)   Why far? Because Odysseus' heart is far away. The conceahnent, as Heidegger says, is  not restricted to this instance of crying, but surrounds this man's existence. Athena brings  this out quite clearly at the beginning of the Odyssey, "It is for Odysseus my heart is  wrung - so subtle^^ a man and so ill-starred; he has long been far from everything that he  loves, desolate in a wave-washed island (from Odyssey, 1, 32-108)." The issue is clearly  not whether the others can see Odysseus crying, but rather that he is cut off from the  others in principle, because when one's heart is elsewhere, the people and things at hand  are not of concern and hence one is not at home with them - is alone and isolated, even  among many others. Odysseus is not and cannot be absorbed in the situation he is in.  This is the case in general, and the crying Odysseus is simply a single manifestation of  the general case.   The connection between Lustre and the uncarmy (deinon) that captures ones' eye,  which is really the most important point of this whole thesis, and one that Heidegger does  not ever make explicitly but in nonetheless central to his entire theory, is brought out  quite explicitly when Hermes comes to the Island of Kalypso, the deine Theos, to demand  the release of Odysseus, "[ijn the space within was the goddess herself, singing with a  lovely voice, moving to and fro at her loom and weaving with a shuttle of Gold. Around  the entrance a wood rose up in abundant growth - alder and aspen and fragrant cypress ...     ^'Also hCTe we see a theme that would be brought out more exphcitly by later thinko^, a  connection between the clever thinker and a not being at-home, which is always connected to a certain  Oddysean nature, an adventurousness. At one point Heidegger says of himself and those who read him  "adventxirer-like, we roam away into the unknowing (WCT, 169)."     138   Even a Deathless One, if he came there, might gaze in wonder at the sight and might be   happier in the heart (from Odyssey, V, 38-125)." The general point of the Odyssey is the  absurdity of man's condition that he at all times abandons and neglects his hearth and  family in the pursuit of adventure and the lustrous and that, in the end, the greatest and  most lustrous beauty is nothing in comparison to what one already has anyway in the  everyday of one's home. Hence Kalypso, complaining that Penelope, to whom Odysseus  wishes to return, cannot possibly be as radiant as she, receives the following response  from Odysseus, "Goddess and queen, do not make this a cause of anger with me. I know  that my wise Penelope, when a man looks at her, is far beneath you in form and stature;  she is a mortal, and you are immortal and unageing. Yet, notwithstanding, my desire and  longing day by day is still to reach my own home and to see the day of my return (from  Odyssey, V, 210-91)." In order to clarify what this means for Heidegger, we must  consider the notion of the Polis.   The Greek notion of Polis does not mean what we think of a city state, but rather  "the pole, the place around which everything appearing to the Greeks as a being turns in  a peculiar way ... the abode of the essence of humanity (P, 89-90)." Zuckart says "/*o/w  was the polos (pole) around wliich beings-as-a-whole was disclosed to man (Postmodern,  58)." The polis is where things appear as they are, pelei. But the polis is also the home  of the counter essence of the abode, polla ta deina ... pelei, manifold is the uncanny  (Antigone 332, cited at P, 90 by Heidegger)." Jacob Burckhardt understood this as the  essential tragedy of the Greek polis, "the frightfulness, the horribleness, the atrociousness  of the Greek Polis (P, 90)." Burckhardt, adopting the insight of his teacher Bockh,     139   structured his teaching of the Greeks around the ground that "the Hellenes were more   unhappy than most people think (P, 90; also cf. BQP, 40)." A young Nietzsche attained  an auditors transcript of this lecture and, as Heidegger says, "cherished the manuscript as  his most precious treasure (90)." Burckhardt, however, since he did not approach the  Greeks in terms of the essential homelessness of man, was unable to understand why the  Polis was understood as a place of disorder and disaster, since Htvspolis is not so much an  actual place as the historical abode of man.   The polis as the abode did not simply bear within itself the horrific as the  uncanny, as was said above, polla ta deina, but also the demon of the human himself, the  essential unhomeliness, restlessness of man. Bemasconi, in his analysis of deinon, fails  to bring out this essential element, "Heidegger understands Sophocles' word "to deinon'  in terms of the relation between know-how as the violence of human know-how and dike  as the overpowering junction (Justice, 85)." Deinon does not concern this, but rather the  essential restlessness, not-being-at-peace of man. McNeil is better here, prefacing an  essay on the deinon with the following key passage from FCM, "Man is that inability to  remain and is yet unable to leave his place (Scarcely, 169). Characterizing the deinon,  McNeill says the following, "Heidegger's translation of to deinon, 'the decisive word,' as  das Unheimliche - intends this word to be understood in the sense of das Unheimische,  that which is 'unhomely,' something 'not at home' that nevertheless belongs, in an ever-  equivocal manner, to the worldly dwelling of human beings (Scarcely, 183)." In precise  note, McNeill adds that for Heidegger "/o deinon is "the fundamental word ... of Greek  tragedy in general, and thereby the fundamental word of Greek antiquity, (cited from     140   Heidegger, Scarcely, 188n.47)."   The Greeks long ago made a decision to cover up the essence of man and lose  themselves in beings, so that they would never have to live in the truth of the essence of  man. Sophocles, in Oedipus at Colonus, puts it in the following way: "But cease now,  and nevermore hereafter awaken such lament (cited at Pa, Postscript to What is  Metaphysics, 238)." Heidegger comments, referring to another place in Sophocles, that  "[s]uch is the rise and the fall of man in his historical abode of essence - hupsipolis -  apolis - far exceeding abodes, homeless, as Sophocles (Antigone) calls man (P, 90)."  What does this mean. Let us briefly recapitulate what we said earlier about the  fundamental attunement of Dasein, which can now speak to us in a much clearer way:  There are many things that press on us in life: the sensation of first eye-contact with a  strange girl, the heartbreak of a love betrayed, the oppression of one's 'rights' that allows  us to take up a cause with all the fire of youth, the need to fight for philosophy against a  common conception of its triviality, the sorrow at the emptiness of religion in our time,  the recklessness of politicians, the television channel changer that is not at hand, and we  could draw this out irifinitely. The fimdamental boredom of human life consists in the  fact that none of these concerns oppress us absolutely, "[t]he deepest, essential need in  Dasein is not that a particular actual need oppresses us, but that an essential  oppressiveness refiises itself, that we scarcely apprehend and are scarcely able to  apprehend this telling refiisal of any oppressiveness as a >^ole (fi-om FCM, 163-165)."  In every way and at all times we lose our selves in our concerns. We fi^antically fi'acture  our attention in endless directions, because the alternative is that we would have to face     141  the essential nature of man, namely, that he can never be at rest, never be satisfied. This  is what the Greeks saw as the fundamental tragedy of human existence.   Only the Greek thinkers would have concluded that the philosopher was the most  necessary element to himian existence, that is, on account of essential homelessness of it.  The masses pursue things, are at home with things to a certain extent, but are yet in  misery, not-at-home, due to their essential restlessness. Since the philosopher attempts  to attend to things which do not absorb us in a transitory way, but rather as that which  always is, it was only the Greek thinkers who would have concluded that the philosopher  is what is most essential. Heidegger comments that   Aristotle, Plato's disciple, relates at one place (Nicomachean Ethics, Z 7, 1141b  77ff ) the basic conception determining the Greek view on the essence of the  thinker: 'It is said they (the thinkers) indeed know things that are excessive, and  thus astounding, and thereby difficult, and hence in general 'demonic (daimonia)'  - but also useless, for they are not seeking what is, according to the  straightforward popular opinion, good for man.' ... The Greeks, to whom we owe  the essence and name of 'philosophy' and of the 'philosopher,' already knew  quite well that thinkers are not 'close to life.' But only the Greeks concluded  from this lack of closeness to life that the thinkers are then the most necessary -  precisely in view of the essential misery of man (P, 100)   What the philosophers pursue, the uncanny, is not opposed to the ordinary, but permeates   the ordinary in a subtle way, although the ordinary understanding cannot see it as such.   We will now ftirther our understanding of the deinon by relating it to the notion of the   child.   Heidegger, in his conrmientary on Heraclitus' word 'Agchibasie" from fragment   122, shows that it has the same meaning as the use of the term 'nearness' in Poetry,   Language, Thought, and brings out the notion of the child and lustre in the Greek sense   rather nicely, as well as a thinking that does not wish to resolve itself (I cite crosswise to     142   conserve space): �   "Scholar: Agchibasie: 'moving-into-neamess,' the word could rather, so it seems  to me now, be the name for our walk today along this country path / Teacher:  Which guides us deep into the night ... / Scientist: that gleams ever more  splendidly ... / Scholar: and overwhelms the stars ... / Teacher: because it nears  their distances in the heavens. / Scientist: ... at least for the naive observer,  although not for the exact [technological] scientist ... / Teacher: Ever to the child  in man, night neighbors the stars. / Scholar: She binds together without seam or  edge or thread. / Scientist: She neighbors; because she works only with nearness. /  Scholar: If she ever works rather than rests ... / Teacher: while wandering upon  the depths of the height (DT, 89-90)."   This understanding of 'child' is exactly what the Greeks saw in children, and something   Holderlin also brought out in his 'Socrates and Alcibiades,' "Why, holy Socrates, must   you always adore this young man? Is there nothing greater than he? Why do you look on   him lovingly, as on a god? - Who has most deeply thought, loves what is most alive, who   has looked at the world, understands youth at its height, and wise men in the end, often   incline to beauty (WCT, 20; also cf WCT, 186, 212)."   The child, then, is specifically what is thought along with lustrous radiance in the   Greek, namely, the being caught up in the lustre of things that is peculiar to a child at   play. The full sense is that of the child in contradistinction to the old person who has lost   a lust for life. Heidegger comments that   Heraclitus uses different names to name what he names logos, names which are  the basic words of his thinking: phusis, the emerging-on-its-own, which at the  same time essentially comes to be a self-concealing; cosmos, which for the  Greeks simultaneously meant order, disposition, and finery which, as flash and  lustre, brings about shining; finally, that which hails him as logos ... Heraclitus  names a/o�. The word is difficult to translate. One says: 'world time.' It is the  world that worlds and temporalizes in that, as cosmos, it brings the jointure of  being to a glowing sparkle ... [Heraclitus says oiaion:] The Geschick of being, a  child that plays, shifting pawns: the royalty of a child (PR, 1 12-3)."   In Antigone, "[t]he chorus is composed of old and experienced men of the city of Thebes.     143  The Greek world is strong enough in itself to acknowledge the radiance and strength of   youth and the level-headedness and wealth of experience brought by age as equally   important, and to maintain the tension between them (HHTI, 51)."   For the Greeks, man is the most unhomely and his care is to become homely (cf   HHTI, 71 ). But the tragedy of existence, as the Greeks saw it, is precisely that this   cannot be achieved, "the sea and the land and the wilderness are those realms that human   beings transform with all their skillfulness, use and make their own, so that they may find   their own vicinity through such realms. The homely is sought after and striven for in the   violent activity of passing through that which is in habitual with respect to sea and earth,   and yet in such passage the homely is precisely not attained ... [Being unhomely is] a   seeking and searching out the homely, a seeking that at times does not know itself   (HHTI, 73-4)." Beings only satisfy us to a certain extent, but never completely. We are   unhomely precisely in our attempt to be at home in beings, we do so by running away   from ourselves, firom our own restlessness, unhomeliness (cf HHTI, 82). Heidegger saw   all of this as the essence of what Nietzsche was teaching.   You know that an assessment of the human situation in relation to the movement  of nihilism and within this movement demands an adequate determination of the  essential. Such knowledge is extensively lacking. This lack dims our view in  assessing our situation. It makes a judgement concerning nihilism ready and easy  and blinds us to the presence of 'this most uncanny of all guests' (Nietzsche, The  Will to Power, Outline. Werke, vol. XV, p. 141). It is called the 'most uncanny'  [unheimlichste] because, as the unconditional will to will, it wills homelessness  [Heimatlosigkeit] as such. This is why it is of no avail to show it the door,  because it has long since been roaming invisibly inside the house (Pa, OQB, 292;  also cf Pa, LH, 257)."Due to its instantiated nature, "[h]omelessness is coming to  be the destiny of the world (Pa, LH, 258)."^     ^'Also cf The epigraph to this thesis.     144   Radiance in the Greek sense is precisely the counter-thought to the deinon of human  existence, which, following what has been said, arises out of the deinon of human  existence, namely, radiance is that of the homely, the hearth. Hence, Heidegger is able to  connect Heraclitus' fire with the lustrous radiance of the gold of Pindar, "[t]he hearth is  the site of being-homely ... Latin vesta is the Roman name for the goddess of the hearth  fire ... para : alongside - beside, or more precisely, in the sphere of the same presence;  parestios, the one who is present within the sphere of protection and intimacy belonging  to the homestead and who belongs to the radiance and warmth and glow of this fire  (HHTI, 106, my emphasis). " This is what Heidegger hears when he uses the term  presence.   One need not strive for the extraordinary in order to be at home, content.  Heidegger says that "[t]he Greeks do not conceive of being jwesent and abiding primarily  in terms of mere duration. For the Greeks, a totally different trait predominates in being  present and abiding - at times specifically expressed through /?ara [coming closer] and  apo [going away] (WCT, 256)." 'Wii^para means "nearness, in the sense of radiance  (WCT, 237)." Nearness here has the same sense as it does in Poetry, Language, Though,  as a being at home or dwelling with things. Heidegger comments fiuther that this  presence is a radiance, "[t]he Greeks experience such duration as a luminous appearance  in the sense of illumined, radiant (WCT, 237)." However, with this radiance, there is a  tacit hinting of "absenting into concealedness (WCT, 237)," for what we are most at  home with is what is precisely what is most in danger of losing its radiance and lustre.     145  We often hear, to use an example from earlier in this thesis, a new song that, for  whatever reason, we deem to be our new favourite and hence buy the song so that we can  play it over and over again. What happens, though, is not that the song in any way  changes, but over time and repetitive playing the song loses the lustre it originally had for  us so that we no longer are so concerned to hear it at every possible juncture.   Philosophers are said to pursue only the fantastic, and so when people come to  philosophers, they too wish to find the fantastic, where they can temporarily satiate their  desires. And yet, for the men who came to Heraclitus and saw him warming himself at  the stove, they were disappointed because there was nothing of the extraordinary.  Heraclitus, noticing their disappointment, called to them and said for them to come in,  for even there at the stove "the gods come to presence (Pa, LH, 270)."   Heidegger interprets, in the famous saying in the Antigone where the many things  and the human are identified in terms of the deinon, the things as uncanny, in relation to  the human that is unhomely. The uncanniness of things does not simply mean things are  incredible, or fearful, for the imcanny in the Greek can also mean Avhat concerns us or  troubles us, or is in habitual or what allows ordinary things as such. In short, anything is  uncaimy in the sense that it draws our attention, captivates us either to a greater or less  degree, interests us in the sense that the lustre of a fine car draws our attention, rather  than the things that do not. This is the sense that Heraclitus' gathering and laying logos  still bears within it, following the older cognate of that word, "[t]he old word alego  (alpha copulativum), archaic after Aeschylus and Pindar, should be recalled here:  something 'lies upon me,' it oppresses and troubles me." (EGT, Logos: Heraclitus     146  fiagment, 60) In this regard, for the Greeks, even pain, as that ^^ch troubles me is  involved here, as pain is also what concerns us, and so serves the same function of alego,  "the Greek word for pain, namely, algos ... [is presumably] related to alego, which as the  intensivum of lego means intimate gathering. In that case, pain would be that v^iiich  gathers most intimately." (Pa, OQB, 305-6) For a general orientation toward the notion  of legem in relation to Heidegger, which is quite well known, we may follow Poggeler,  "[t]he legein in logos is a placing and a gleaning; the placing is a placing together,  bringing-together-into-lying-before and having-lie-before." (Path, 160). This is meant in  the sense of the gathering up of the harvest so as to have it lie before us (cf PA, Phusis,  213). But the harvest that is gathered is not simply something indifferent to us.  Following what has been said, we shall add that "/egem, to lay, by its letting-lie-together-  before means just this, that whatever lies before us involves us and therefore concerns us  (EGT, Logos: Heraclitus fragment, 62)." Hence, logos is intimately related to our  concerns (cf WCT, 202).   Because the thinker is a step back from life, he sees the lustre of the uncanny,  "[ejveryday opinion seeks ... the endless variety of novelties which are displayed before  it. It does not see the quiet gleam (the gold) of the mystery that everlastingly shines in  the simplicity of the lighting (EGT, Heraclitus, Aletheia, 122; also cf EGT, Moira:  Parmenides, 100)." The thinker sees the beings, and also Being, and so sees the  difference between them. The beings we deal with are of the hearth, we are at home with  them. This is thought in relation to the unhomely with the Greeks, so that the difference  between Being and beings is a difference of place. Heidegger, commenting on Plato,     147  says "that between beings and Being there prevails the chohsmos, he chora is the locus,  the site, the place. Plato means to say: beings and Being are in different places (WCT,  227)."   Demon in relation to the human is being understood as unhomely, and this  because its counter word in the Antigone is the hearth. A knowledge of the hearth is also  displayed in exposing the uncaimy, since the uncanny is uncovered against the hearth.  But the knowledge of the hearth is not directly exposed. Rather, it is a different kind of  knowledge. It is a "pAronem, a pondering and meditating that comes from phren, that is  from the heart, from the iimermost middle of the human essence. This knowledge fi^om  the heart is an intimating, but one that possesses a lucidity and clarity different from  normal thinking (from HHTI, 107-8)."   Holderlin says that Full of merit, yet poetically/Humans dwell upon the earth.   Heidegger, in his commentary on this, brings out what he sees as technology in relation   to the uncanniness of existence that we have been speaking of, as the essence of techne,   'Full of merit ...' humans indeed dwell. In what they effect and in their works  they are capable of a fullness. It is almost impossible to survey wiiat humans  achieve, the way in which they establish themselves upon this earth in using and  exploiting and working it, in protecting it and securing it and furthering their  'art,' that is, in Greek, techne. 'Yet' - none of this reaches into the essential  ground of their dwelling upon this earth. All this working and achieving, this  building and cultivating, is merely cultura, culture. Culture is always already  only the consequence of a 'dwelling,' of a being 'at home' of spirit. Such  dwelling, however, being properly homely, is the becoming homely of a being  unhomely (HHTI, 137)   The mortals inhabit the earth, and yet there dwelling is not grounded in the earth, but in   the sky where the unknown God is concealed. In the sky there is a radiance of beauty,   there blooms a lovely blueness, Holderlin says (cf WCT, 193-4).     148   It is, as has been said above, the unhomeliness of man that drives him to be at   home in things. Heidegger says that   As long as man is wholly absorbed in nothing but purposefiil self-assertion, not  only is he himself imshielded, but so are things, because they have become  objects. In this, to be sure, there also lies a transmutation of things into what is  inward and visible. But this transmutation replaces the frailties of things by the  thought-contrived fabrications of calculated objects. These objects are produced  to be used up. The more quickly they are used up, the greater becomes the  necessity to replace them even more quickly and more readily (PLT, WPF, 129-  30)."   The essence of technology consists in this, the "restless (PLT, T, 166)," unending drive to   increase our mastery over beings, to reduce the distance between us and them, which   none the less does not bring a nearness, to be at peace and at home in things in a way that   would quench the ever increasing restless attempt to master beings.^' It is, as the   characteristic of man's restlessness, a lack of dwelling, a not being at home.   Counterposed to the unhomely, to restlessness, dwelling is to be at peace, "in w^t does   the nature of dwelling consist? ... The Old Saxon wuon, the Gothic wunian, like the old   word bauen, mean to remain, to stay in place. But the Gothic wunian says more   distinctly how this remaining is experienced. Wunian means: to be at peace, to be   brought to peace, to remain in peace (PLT, BDT, 148-9)." Said otherwise, the   unhomeliness of man consists precisely in his lack of ability to remain at home, "The   real dwelling plight lies in this, that mortals ever search anew for the nature of dwelling,   that they must ever learn to dwell (PLT, BDT, 161)."   Poetry is remembrance, Andenken. The poet is given an initial flash, an insight,   but it is too much. The poem is a re-collecting of what was given in the flash (cf HHTI,     ''The reader should refer to PLT, T, 165-6; PLT, PMD, 228.     149   151). Remembrance, (A/we/n^oywe) is the mother of the muses. Philosophy too is a   remembrance, a remembering of the essence of humanity from out of the presence of   things and his presence with them. The later interpretation by Plato of being as eidos,   that aspect that we have already seen when we encoimter things (hence he understood   thinking as recollection), is derivative of this original remembrance of presence,   'To have seen' is related to self-illuminating presencing. Seeing is determined,  not by the eye, but by the lighting of Being. Presence within the lighting  articulates all the human senses. The essence of seeing, as 'to have seen,' is to  know. Knowledge embraces vision and remains indebted to presencing.  Knowledge is remembrance of Being. That is why Mnemosune is mother of the  muses. Knowledge is not science in the modem sense. Knowledge is thoughtful  maintenance of Being's preserve (EGT, Anaximander fragment, 36)   How is light to be understood? Of course, "[t]he word 'light' means lustrous, beaming,   brightening (EGT, Heraclitus, Aletheia, 103)." Heidegger says that "thinking is neither   theoretical or practical, but rather comes to pass before this distinction. Such thinking is,   insofar as it is, recollection of being and nothing else ... Such thinking has no result. It   has no effect. It satisfies its essence in that it is (Pa, LH, 272)."   Heidegger suggests that philosophy does not, as the Greeks thought, have to be a  response to the essential misery of man which hence takes flight into the unchanging in  order to counteract the transitory and restless nature of man. Rather, if we affirm the  restlessness itself, we can come to a thinking that does not will a linearity and death of  the question, but rather a circularity that wills only a further depth to the questioning,  which he understands as the essence of hermeneutics. This must be understood in  relation to the notion of place.   Heidegger's use of the term place in reference to humans means where one is     150  coming from. We mean this when we say something like 'where was he coming from  v^en he verbally assaulted her like that?' And in response hear 'she had stolen his car a  year ago and he hadn't seen her until now. ' The place is the context from which you are  speaking, in the light of which what is being said is understandable. In relation to  someone's actions it might be said that they are coming from a place of great bravery - it  is that in relation to which you are the way you are, w^ich for the Greeks meant the  deinon of the human. For the Roman soldier of the imperium, on the contrary, their  actions were specifically related to the magisterial sense of what it meant to be Roman,  although the leaders probably acted out of a paranoia more than anything else. We do  not often in English mention the term 'place' when we try to determine where someone  is coming from, although for Heidegger it manifests itself quite readily, such as, for  instance, when he informs someone in the seminar that "[w]ith my questions, I would  only like to get at the place from which you speak of another night (HS, 54)."   Heidegger's argument for what he sees as the Hermeneutic circle is not just  something he arbitrarily thought up, but rather the motion of it speaks to what he  understands to be the highest possibility for a person, continuous questioning. In order to  understand this, we must think of the movement of the person in relation to his place, the  unhomely, and specifically in terms of how the Greeks understood this movement. Of  movement for the Greeks there are two kinds, linear and circular. The earth was the  center of everything, and everything moved in relation to it. As movement means a  striving toward its place, something like a rock strives toward the earth and fire away  from it. The velocity of something increases the closer it gets to its place. Force or     151   Ehinamis, the capacity for motion, resides in the thing itself. Linear motion is incomplete   because there is a striving toward the place, the topos, but the topos is, as it were,   separate from the thing striving toward it. Circular motion for the Greeks, that of the   stars, is complete in that the place is not separate from the movement. The earth is still   the center with respect to the movement of the heavenly bodies, but heavenly bodies do   not depend on the earth. Hence, Heidegger says, '[h]ow a body moves depends upon its   species and the place to which it belongs. The where determines the how of its being, for   being is called presence (Anwesenheit).' A body needs to be forced in order to move   away from its place, and will eventually stop because there is no reason in the thing itself   for the movement. Since circular movement accords with the place, its pace is constant   and unending. The process of hermeneutics is circular because it accords with the place   of the person and hence evolves according to an unending process of further questioning,   and not answers that try to eliminate the question in a result that can then lead to further   progress . This is why, given the understanding of motion we have here, Heidegger   contrasts the circularity of his thought with the linear nature of normal thinking. This is   not because he is trying to arbitrarily act in accord with the being of the human, but   rather the matter itself accords with it.   Thus it is that we find ourselves moving in a circle. Ordinary understanding can  only perceive and grasp what lies straight in front of it: thus it wishes to advance  in a straight line, moving from the nearest point to the next one, and so on. This  is called progress. Ordinary understanding can only perceive circular movement  in its own way too: that is to say, it moves along the circumference, taking its  movement around the circle in a straightforward progression, until suddenly it  stumbles upon the starting-point and comes to a standstill, at a loss because of its  lack of progress. Since progress is the criterion employed by ordinary  understanding, such understanding finds any circular movement objectionable  and considers it a sign of impossibility. The fateful thing, however, is that this     152   argument about circular movement is employed in philosophy itself, even though  it is but a symptom of a tendency to reduce philosophy to the level of ordinary  understanding (FCM, 187).     153  CONCLUSION  PHILOSOPHY AND HONESTY/DECEPTION ; Plato's Heidegger?   In this conclusioa, I would like to talk about honesty and deception as it relates to  a way to being able to finalize this thesis on the tragic nature of Greek existence.  Deception, as the counter thought to honesty, can be characterized in the following way,  although this passage is taken from Heidegger in an unrelated context, "not to hide  something to oneself, not to fool oneself, ie., not to delude oneself" (P, 37) It is used in  this sense when he speaks, as he often does, as thinking in terms of a not deceiving  oneself, "The realm of the 'concealed-unconcealed' is, if we do not deceive ourselves,  more immediately familiar and accessible than what is expressed in the banal title Veritas  and 'truth'." (P, 13)   Heidegger's thinking is different from technical thinking that only wills a result.   Such 'knowledge' seizes the being, 'dominates' it, and thereby goes beyond it and  constantly surpasses it. The character of essential knowing is entirely different.  It concerns the being in its ground - it intends Being. Essential 'knowing' does  not lord over what it knows but is solicitous toward it ... [Modem Science] is  always a technical attack on a being and an intervention for purposes of an  'orientation' toward acting, 'producing,' wheeling and dealing. Thoughtful  heedfulness, in contrast , is attention to a claim that does not arise from the  separate facts and events of reality and does not concern man in the superficiality  of his everyday occupations (P, 4)   Heidegger was not the first to characterize scientific thinking as an attack on the being.  Leibniz even characterized perception in this way. (cf EGT, Moira: Parmenides, 82) In  any case, I would like the reader to attend to the distinction between normal scientific  thinking and essential thinking, as well as the trivializing of the everyday opinion.     154  Heidegger took up honesty specifically as a problem and as the problem of  thinking, according to the spirit of the time, as in Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, although  not limited to them, it crops up everywhere. Honesty, as must be kept in mind in order to  distinguish it firom genuineness (which is a minor distinction that Heidegger only  occasionally maintains, and both are, in any case, thought of as coimter words for  deception. Honesty is a thinking a question through to its answer so as to eliminate the  question that gave rise to the thinking. Genuineness simply does this in order to ask the  question in a more original way), is a thinking througji, a thinking a problem through..  Schelling, in one place, says "Most people, if they were honest, would admit in terms of  their ideas ... (cited in S, 69). Heidegger comments that '"Most people, if they were  honest' - [this means] if they really wanted to consider and think through what they are  appealing to ... [if man's ideas] are taken out of fog and innocuousness with some  honesty ... [and were to see what is] honestly experienced (70-71)." In other words, put  negatively, as Heidegger usually does, if people would not deceive themselves into  thinking they have something by holding on to ideas that they have not honestly thought  through ....   In order to distinguish his thinking from the tradition, Heidegger, if he is being  careful about it, speaks of genuineness instead of honesty, but only to distinguish it from  technical thinking, since he uses either as the counter-word to deception. Heidegger  writes in Beitrage that "Genuineness is also more essential that honesty. Honesty always  has to do only with unfolding what is already given and accessible (consider the genuine  and the plain and the simple) ... Genuineness means creative strength for preserving what     155  is given along with, creative for effecting what is given as a task. Genuineness of the  heart, of courage, of the attuned-knowing persevering will. Essential patience [is] utmost  courage (CTP, 256)."   Although citing a plethora of examples does nothing if it does not speak out of  the matter at hand, we can at least see here the extent to which it does cast the problem  of thinking in the light of the relation between honesty and deception, "It is important  above all ... we do not deceive ourselves and rashly bypass the pressing questions (WCT,  8 - also cf 34, etc.; for 'honesty, cf 41, 45, 217)." Why, though, is philosophy cast in the  light of honesty?   The difficulty of this question can hardly even be intimated in a conclusion to a  thesis, although it does bear a particularly special relation to the Greeks and so is perhaps  a good point to end with here. 'Honesty, that which presses beyond self-deception, ' as a  characterization of philosophical thinking is so prevalent and basic to the European  continental tradition that it might seem almost pointless to raise the issue. Philosophy is  honesty - who could argue with that? Almost by definition, philosophy presses through  the self-deception of the everyday commonplace opinion out of a manner of being of the  thinker that involves trying to become more and more honest with oneself At the point  at which one no longer does this, one is no longer a philosopher. Nietzsche, for instance,  once said of Schopenhauer that he lost his philosopher's composure whenever it got to  the issue of Atheism, because for Schopenhauer the godlessness of existence was simply  palpable and was not an issue that could be put into question (cf Gay Science, Book 5).  In other words, Nietzsche said that Schopenhauer (whom Nietzsche elsewhere called one     156   of the most honest writers of his time) stopped being a philosopher jwecisely at the point   where he was no longer willing to be honest enough with himself to see if he was being   deceived about the non-existence of God, since positing the opposite of the theological   ideal is still idealisting, just in the latter case one is less honest about the fact that one is   guessing.   To what extent Schopenhauer's nihihsm still follows from the same ideal that created  Christian theism - One felt so certain about the highest desiderata, the highest values,  the highest perfection that the philosophers assumed this as an absolute certainty, as  if it were a priori: 'God' at the apex as a given truth. 'To become as God,' 'to be  absorbed into God' - for thousands of years these were the most naive and  convincing desiderata (but what convinces is not necessarily true - it is merely  convincing: a note for asses). One has unlearned the habit of conceding to this  posited ideal the reaUty of a person; one has become atheistic. But has the ideal itself  been renounced? ... Schopenhauer wanted it otherwise [than theism] and therefore  had to conceive of this metaphysical ground as the opposite of the ideal - as 'evil,  blind will' ... But even so he did not renounce the absoluteness of the ideal - he  sneaked by (Will To Power, number 17, rev. 1888).   There is, then, a kind of philosophical existence that involves a being-honest with   oneself, and an average everyday existence that involves a being-deceived by opinions   and the immediate. Heidegger, as has been clear throughout this paper, always sets up a   strong distinction between the philosophical overcoming of deception. In the end, even   his critique of technical thinking is premised on the point that it technical thinking)   subordinates thought to production, or in other words sacrifices honesty whenever it is a   question of getting a result. Traditional philosophical thinking, insofar as it wills the   result, the answer, and hence wills the annihilation of the question, is not genuine   thinking because it sets out with the need to make things easy for itself and remove all   the weight from the question. In other words, for Heidegger technical philosophical   thinking is even worse than everyday opinion because it conunits a fr^ud by pretending     157  to be honest or genuine, >^^le at the same time deceiving itself in principle.   What Heidegger does not ask, though, is vvliy is it so necessary that philosophy  attack the commonplace and everyday For the inunediate and everyday is no less  necessary that the philosophical. Without the commonplace and everyday deceptions  that philosophy is called on to press though, there would be nothing for philosophy to do,  any more than there would be ontological structure of everyday things without the  everyday things. It could be concluded that if the value of philosophy over common  opinion is not gained from the necessity of one over the other, then periiaps it stems  merely from the fact that philosophical truths are more obscure and esoteric. Plato did  conclude this, although it is somewhat difficult to see because even afrer a thesis on the  tragic nature of Greek existence we still have little intimation of the extent to which the  Greeks put a question mark over their lives.   In the Symposium, Plato, wlio Aristotle identified as a great thinker and  melancholic, implicitly challenged Parmenides' notion that the thinker pursues what  calls for thinking merely out of a drive that is good unto itself Plato purposely forces the  figure of Alcibiades (the paradigm of beauty and excellence in a Greek Person) between  Socrates, the Philosopher, and Agathon, the good (man), in order to put into question the  relationship between the philosopher and the good. After Socrates finishes giving his  speech on love, Alcibiades jumps up and shouts at the audience to not to listen to  Socrates because he has been deceiving them. Plato writes that "I hope you didn't believe  a single word Socrates said: the truth is just the opposite! He's the one vtiio will most surely  beat me up if I dare praise anyone else in his presence - even a god!' 'Hold your tung!'     158  Socrates said. 'By god, don't you dare deny it!' Alcibiades shouted. 'I would never - never  - praise anyone else with you around' (2 14d)." In order to understand this, it needs to be  kept in mind that Plato is putting into question the kind of iove' that pertains to the  philosopher as a philosopher (a 'lover' of wisdom). In order to see the problem, we need  to distinguish between something like a good love and honesty, and a malicious love and  honesty. The former would be something like what the philosopher is supposed to have  for wisdom. The latter would be something like the following: imagine an unattractive  boy that is in love with a beautiful girl. Now, the girl loves an attractive boy, and the  unattractive boy is resentful. Even though the unattractive boy is not of such a physical  nature as to be able to get the girl, he does have other devices at his disposal. He can  point out to the girl that although the boy she loves is att